LES ACTIVITÉS NUCLÉAIRES : RAYONNEMENTS IONISANTS ET RISQUES POUR LA SANTÉ ET L’ENVIRONNEMENT up to date with their training for the transport of class 7 hazardous materials (no deviations noted), ASNR still found all too regularly that the on-board vehicle kit (fire extinguisher, signalling equipment in the event of an accident, etc.) required for the vehicle was not complete (in almost one inspection in five) and that the transport package was not complete or correctly marked (in more than one inspection in four). Lastly, the companies must continue to devote considerable efforts not only to defining an exhaustive programme of verifications as required by the Labour Code and implementing it correctly (deviations were noted in nearly one in three inspections), but also to correcting the deviations found during these verifications and ensuring the traceability of the corrections made (deviations were noted in nearly half the inspections). ASNR also notes disparities in the quality of the technical files it has to examine for inspection preparation or follow-up, and those received for licence applications. The companies must in particular be more attentive to the reports establishing the conformity of their facilities with the appropriate technical baseline requirements. ASNR still detects errors too frequently, particularly when production of these reports has been subcontracted, and these errors sometimes lead to nonconformities, even if few deviations are found during the inspections of components of the safety, signalling and alarm system. ASNR considers that the risks of incidents and the workers’ occupational exposure are generally well controlled by the companies when radiography is performed in a bunker complying with the applicable regulations. France has a good network of permanent industrial radiography facilities, despite some regional disparities. The figures in 2025 stand at: ∙90 licensed gamma radiography facilities (38 gamma radiography facilities and 52 combined facilities, that is to say which can accommodate either gamma ray projectors or electrical devices emitting X-rays or particle accelerators); ∙520 licensed X-ray radiography facilities (460 facilities using electrical X-ray devices, 52 combined facilities and 8 facilities using particle accelerators). This network thus enables 83% of the professionals to propose industrial radiography services within facilities (54% for gamma radiography). Despite the availability of such facilities, ASNR still observes too often that parts that undergo radiography on worksites could have been easily moved to a facility. Apart from optimising doses for the workers, it would also eliminate the risk of having to temporarily shut down the worksite (which could last several days) due to the setting up of an exclusion area, in the event of an incident preventing the radioactive source of a gamma ray projector from returning to the safe position. In addition, ASNR notes that the reduction in the number of facilities providing on-site gamma radiography services in recent years and in certain regions (for economic reasons of consolidation, or to limit the number of premises to be brought into compliance with source security requirements) is increasing operational constraints, for example through increased travel times, which may have adverse consequences for the proper conduct of inspections. ASNR considers that the ordering customers have a key role to play to improve radiation protection in industrial radiography, by favouring industrial radiography services in a facility, or even turning to alternative technologies. Indeed, with regard to application of the principles of justification and optimisation, the long-term reflections undertaken by the non-destructive testing professionals have resulted in guidelines which aim to promote the use of alternative methods to industrial radiography. The work is continuing within the professional bodies, in particular with the updating of the construction and maintenance codes for industrial equipment, in order to promote the use of non-ionising inspection methods. Enhancing the awareness of all the players is therefore a priority. The regional initiatives to establish charters of good practices in industrial radiography implemented for several years now at the instigation of ASN and the labour inspectorate, particularly in areas corresponding to the (former) regions of Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, Normandie, Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Bretagne and Pays de la Loire, allow regular exchanges between the various stakeholders. The ASNR regional divisions and other regional administrations concerned also regularly organise regional awareness-raising and discussion symposia for which the actors of this professional branch show a real interest. Finally, in 2025, unlike in previous years, abnormal exposures, and in one case overexposure of industrial radiography operators, were reported to ASNR. Thus, a gamma radiography operator was exposed (1.5 millisieverts – mSv – to the whole body and 3.7 mSv to the hand) when he entered an operating area when the source was not in the safe position in the projector. Two French operators carrying out X-ray radiography work in Belgium were also exposed (9.7 mSv and 0.8 mSv respectively for the whole body, and an estimated 120 mSv in limb dose for each operator) when they entered an operating area while the electrical equipment emitting X-rays was not switched off. Although these two events are separate, they nevertheless have two common causes: the signposting of the operating area, which was inadequate in the first case and not seen in the second, and the use of radiation protection instrumentation, which was absent in the first case (active dosimeter and radiation meter not used although available) and inadequate and inappropriate in the second (only one operator equipped with an operational dosimeter but with an unsuitable measurement range and radiation meter available but not used). As the event involved employees from the same company (but from different facilities), ASNR is paying particular attention to identifying potential human and organisational factors contributing to the occurrence of these incidents and ensuring that the company properly implements the national action plan it has submitted in order to prevent any further occurrences. However, although several significant incidents involving loss of control of the source (“source jamming”) during the use of a gamma radiography projector occurred, as in the two previous years, no inappropriate or prohibited action or handling was undertaken by the operators, thereby avoiding unnecessary exposure or complicating the subsequent interventions required to restore the situation to normal. HIGHLIGHT No. 8 Loss of control of the source in gamma radiography Loss of control of the source (“source jamming”) is one of the main causes of incidents in this area of gamma radiography. It can lead to significant exposure of the workers situated nearby, or even of the public when working in urban areas. This loss of control is primarily encountered in two situations: • The radioactive source remains jammed in its guide tube. The cause of the blockage is often the presence of foreign bodies in the tube, or deterioration of the tube itself. • The front of the projector is not fully blanked due to either the presence of foreign bodies in the channel preventing full retraction of the source, or breaking of the plug. In France, gamma radiography projectors comply with technical specifications that are stricter than the international ISO standards. However, equipment failures can never be ruled out, especially in the event of poor upkeep of the equipment. In the last few years, incorrect manipulations have also been observed further to “source jamming” incidents. ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025 249 01 05 02 06 03 04 09 10 07 11 13 08 12 A / Z
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