LES ACTIVITÉS NUCLÉAIRES : RAYONNEMENTS IONISANTS ET RISQUES POUR LA SANTÉ ET L’ENVIRONNEMENT ∙the setting up of procedures to ensure that the checks conducted on the goods or transport vehicles do not lead to accidental exposure of workers or other individuals. The use of ionising technologies to seek out illegal immigrants in transport vehicles is prohibited in France. During customs inspections of trucks using tomographic techniques, for example, the drivers must be kept away from the vehicle and other checks must be performed prior to irradiation to detect the presence of any illegal immigrants, in order to avoid unjustified exposure of people during the inspection. 3.3.2 – Evaluation of the radiation protection situation The use of particle accelerators presents significant radiation exposure risks for the workers; ASNR is particularly attentive to these facilities and therefore inspects them regularly. Between 2023 and 2025, 51 facilities equipped with these devices were inspected by ASNR, 21 of them in 2025. ASNR considers the radiation protection situation in the facilities using these devices to be satisfactory on the whole. In effect, the key requirements for conducting this activity with a satisfactory level of radiation protection (organisation of radiation protection, informing and training, technical verifications, radiological zoning and design of the premises in which these devices are used) are appropriately implemented by the large majority of the licensees concerned. However, these inspections have also identified areas for improvement (although around 70% of the facilities inspected are 5. One and the same key can be used to gain access to the room and render operational the accelerator's control console. Furthermore, these keys cannot be removed from the access door locks if the doors are open. already properly implementing these provisions), which ASNR will continue to monitor closely: ∙the presence of an unlocking device that can be operated from inside premises where particle accelerators are used; ∙compliance with the regulations concerning the frequency of technical verifications of radiation devices and associated equipment and the formalised processing of any nonconformities detected during these checks; ∙the correct operation of the audio signal associated with the in situ check process to ensure nobody is in the room before the emission of ionising radiation can be enabled; ∙the presence of key locks on the control console(5) the presence of locks with captive keys on the control console and on all the accesses to the rooms in which particle accelerators are used. Although the main access is always equipped with this type of lock, this is not always the case for the secondary access points which are used more occasionally; ∙the control of the technical means (password, dedicated key, etc.) allowing the safety systems to be overridden in the context of highly specific maintenance and servicing procedures. These means must be monitored constantly to ensure they are not used otherwise than for these specific procedures; ∙the availability of radiation monitoring devices in sufficient quantities for the operators who access these rooms and the keeping of these devices in good working order. Lastly, with regard to OEF, two ESRs were reported to ASNR in 2025 by facilities using particle accelerators for scientific research purposes and the analysis of works of art. HIGHLIGHT No. 9 Accidental irradiation of a worker at the Louvre Centre for Research and Restoration of the Museums of France (C2RMF) – ESR level 3 on the INES scale 1. Standard defining the minimum design requirements for installations where particle accelerators are used for industrial, research, and veterinary purposes. On 24 July 2025, the C2RMF declared a significant radiation protection event to ASNR concerning the localised irradiation of a worker by a proton beam from the “AGLAE” particle accelerator, used for analysing works of art. The irradiation caused a first-degree radiation burn on the worker’s forearm, manifested by reddening of the skin, characteristic of a deterministic effect caused by exposure to ionising radiation. ASNR carried out an on-site reactive inspection on 30 July 2025, followed by reinforced monitoring of the proper management of the aftermath of the incident by C2RMF (analysis of the incident and implementation of the relevant corrective actions to avoid any further occurrences). Analysis of the incident at this stage shows that the event resulted from the convergence of several factors: • Hardware failure: the mechanical failure of a position sensor on one of the devices intercepting the particle beam (equivalent to a shutter) did not result in any information being transferred to the installation’s safety PLC. The undetermined state of the sensor’s position caused the PLC to malfunction, and it did not interrupt the beam, as it should have done, when the worker removed the captive key used to open the access door to the measurement area, or when this access was opened. • Human and organisational factors: users did not check the actual state of the accelerator before entering the experimental zone, when they could have checked via the software interface and the light signals at the entrance to the zone. In addition, the acquisition time was abnormally long on the day of the incident due to beam instability, which misled the operator about the state of the equipment. • Constraint linked to the object investigated: handling a particularly fragile part led the operator to insert his arm between the object and the particle beam extraction nozzle, which is not normally necessary. The corrective actions taken by C2RMF involved replacing the faulty position sensor, changing the programming of the safety PLC (in particular to take account of the possible failure of the position sensors), making changes to the man-machine interfaces, simplifying the light displays (which were too numerous and confusing in terms of the risk indicated) and rewriting the associated instructions. At national level, ASNR has drawn up a roadmap to incorporate the Operating Experience Feedback from this incident in order to strengthen radiation protection in facilities using particle accelerators. In particular, there are plans to: • identify facilities equipped with safety control systems or those fitted with particle beam shut-off devices; • verify, in the facilities concerned, that the status of the shielding devices is monitored by the safety system and that a failure of the components enabling this monitoring automatically triggers the facility’s safety shutdown. If not, an upgrade will be required; • communicate the lessons learned from this incident to the committee responsible for revising the NF M 62-105(1) standard, which could be made more explicit on certain aspects, primarily the monitoring of the position of shutters where they exist and the requirements relating to test protocols for verifying the proper functioning of safety components; • strengthen ASNR’s oversight of the robustness of the technical checks designed to detect any malfunction of the safety system, and of the clarity of warning lights and displays (including on control screens), which must, without ambiguity, enable the status of the facility to be ascertained at all times. Finally, ASNR will share the OEF gained from this incident and its international aftermath with other regulators. 252 ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025
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