LES ACTIVITÉS NUCLÉAIRES : RAYONNEMENTS IONISANTS ET RISQUES POUR LA SANTÉ ET L’ENVIRONNEMENT ASN examined the Safety Options Dossier (DOS) for this reactor project, with the support of IRSN, taking account of the recommendations of Guide No. 22 on PWR design. In its opinion of 16 July 2019, ASN considered that the general safety objectives, the baseline safety requirements and the main design options were on the whole satisfactory and, in its opinion and in a supplementary letter sent to EDF in July 2021, identified the subjects to be considered in greater detail for a future BNI DAC. 5.2 Technical reviews and inspections carried out in 2025 5.2.1 – EPR 2 reactor project at the Penly site As set out in Article L. 592-29 of the Environment Code, the Minister responsible for nuclear safety instructed ASNR to carry out the technical review of the creation authorisation application for the two EPR 2 reactors on the Penly site. This review is currently in progress. It follows on from the review of the EPR 2 reactors safety options. In 2025, ASNR completed most of the expert assessments associated with this review. In particular, it convened the Advisory Committee of Experts for Nuclear Reactors to examine the design of safety systems (19 and 20 June 2025), studies of accidents without core melt (25 and 26 November 2025) and the consideration of hazards in nuclear safety cases (16 and 17 December 2025). ASNR will submit the conclusions of its review to the Government in 2026. In addition to the technical examination of the application by ASNR, the examination procedure includes a consultation phase, described in Articles R. 593‑21 to R. 593-25 of the Environment Code. For the Penly EPR 2 reactors, this consultation phase began at the end of July 2025, when the Prefect of Seine-Maritime referred the matter to the Environmental Authority. The Environmental Authority issued its opinion on 10 October 2025. In 2025, ASNR launched a programme to monitor the initial work on the site. Two inspections were carried out on the oversight of the first site activities, i.e. the creation of the seafront breakwater. These inspections showed that EDF had correctly deployed oversight actions for the activities from the start of the works. In addition, ASNR noted that EDF was taking appropriate measures to avoid defects likely to damage the concrete used for the protective blocks on the seawall. HIGHLIGHT No. 15 Adaptation of NPE manufacturing controls for the EPR 2 programme In preparation for the EPR 2 reactor construction programme, ASNR is adapting its approach to controlling the manufacture of Nuclear Pressure Equipment (NPE), taking into account feedback from the Flamanville EPR reactor and EDF’s decision to mass-produce this equipment using the same design. These adaptations have been drawn up in consultation with manufacturers, incorporating the lessons learned from the main discrepancies encountered during the manufacture of EPR reactor equipment, in particular defects detected in the secondary system welds, those in the welds of the vessel head adapters, and the problem of carbon segregation in the vessel domes. These difficulties called for a tightening of the measures put in place during the manufacturing process, as well as an adjustment to the oversight system based on improved information-sharing between manufacturers, authorised inspection bodies, EDF and ASNR. In addition, the implementation of conformity assessment procedures, for the first time in the context of the construction of a new reactor, posed practical difficulties in the case of the Flamanville EPR reactor. ASNR has therefore adapted its approach to the oversight: • by carrying out more early and progressive checks on design and manufacture, to avoid deviations being identified or dealt with too late; • by spelling out its expectations upstream, to enable the players involved to set them out in advance in a stabilised industrial reference framework. Lastly, ASNR is adapting its conformity assessment procedures, which were previously carried out on a one-off basis, to the mass production of the EPR 2 programme. The year 2025 provided three practical illustrations of these developments. Firstly, in 2025, ASNR initiated qualification procedures for the manufacturing processes of a large number of large forged components intended for NPE in EPR 2 reactors (shells and domes for reactor vessels and steam generators, main primary piping, etc.). These approaches are now based on a large number of chemical or mechanical tests, which are carried out and analysed by the manufacturer prior to the production of mass-produced parts. The meeting of the Advisory Committee of Experts for Nuclear Pressure Equipment (GPESPN) held on 9 December 2025 confirmed that these developments were satisfactory compared with the situation during the manufacture of the large forged components for the EPR reactor, both in terms of the control exercised by ASNR and the quality control of the manufacture itself. In September 2025, ASNR also issued a position statement on the professional code used by manufacturers for the design and manufacture of NPE (Afcen’s RCC-M code). This code contains a set of provisions covering the design, manufacture and end-of-production inspection of this equipment. It has been chosen by EDF to form the basis of the technical requirements that will be imposed on all NPE manufacturers and their suppliers for the EPR 2 project. ASNR has recognised the provisions and methods of this code as appropriate for demonstrating the compliance of equipment with the requirements of the NPE Order. ASNR has specified certain conditions of application, in order to take full advantage of OEF for the Flamanville EPR reactor, particularly in the areas of welding and heat treatment. These conditions of application have been the subject of extensive consultation with manufacturers to ensure that they are applicable. It provides manufacturers with a stabilised technical reference framework for the EPR 2 programme, which ASNR considers to be favourable to equipment quality control. Finally, ASNR is working with the industry to revise Guide No. 8 on the NPE conformity assessment procedure, which defines the design and manufacturing control procedures. The purpose of this revision is to clarify and specify ASNR’s expectations of the players concerned (licensees, manufacturers and inspection bodies). ASNR plans to publish this revision in early 2026. Modelling of the EPR 2 reactors at the Penly site (on the left in the photo). The EPR 2s will be built alongside the two 1,300 MWe reactors currently in operation at the NPP. 308 ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025
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