LES ACTIVITÉS NUCLÉAIRES : RAYONNEMENTS IONISANTS ET RISQUES POUR LA SANTÉ ET L’ENVIRONNEMENT 2 – ASNR actions in the field of “fuel cycle” facilities: a graded approach 2.1 The graded approach according to the risks of the facilities At each step in the “fuel cycle”, the potential risks in the facilities are different: ∙The conversion and enrichment facilities mainly entail toxic risks (owing to the chemical form of the radioactive substances they use), criticality risks (when they use enriched materials) and the risk of dissemination of radioactive substances (in powder, liquid or crystallised form). ∙The fuel fabrication facilities mainly entail toxic risks (when they have conversion units), criticality, fire or explosion risks (processes using heating methods), as well as the risk of dissemination of radioactive substances (in powder form) and of exposure to ionising radiation (when they use reprocessed substances). ∙The spent fuel reprocessing facilities mainly entail risks of dissemination of radioactive substances (the substances used are mainly liquids and powders), of criticality (the fissile substances employed change geometrical shape) and exposure to ionising radiation (the fuels contain highly irradiating substances). Their common point is that they never seek to create chain reactions (prevention of the criticality risk) and that they use substances that are dangerous, owing to their radiological or chemical properties, in industrial quantities. Conventional industrial risks are often preponderant; certain plants, such as Orano at Tricastin and La Hague or Framatome at Romans-sur-Isère, are in this respect subject to the Seveso Directive. ASNR devotes efforts to applying oversight that is proportionate to the potential risks of each facility. These are thus classified by ASNR in one of the three categories defined according to the scale of the risks and their impacts on safety, health and the environment. This BNI classification enables the oversight and monitoring of the facilities to be adapted, reinforcing the inspections and the scope of the reviews carried out by ASNR for the higher risk facilities. When the installations are substantially modified or when they are finally shut down, ASNR is in charge of examining these modifications, which are the subject of an amending decree from the Government, after prior consultation of ASNR. ASNR also establishes binding requirements for these main steps. Finally, ASNR also reviews the safety files justifying the operation of each BNI. For each facility, ASNR monitors the organisation and means chosen by the licensee to enable it to assume its responsibilities in terms of nuclear safety, radiation protection, emergency management in the event of an accident and protection of the environment and public health and safety. ASNR monitors the working of the organisations put into place by the licensees mainly through inspections, more specifically those devoted to safety management. 2.2 Periodic safety reviews of “fuel cycle” facilities Since the publication of the Decree of 2 November 2007, all the BNI licensees must carry out periodic safety reviews of their facilities at least every ten years. These exercises were carried out gradually on the “fuel cycle” facilities. Defining the review procedures may be somewhat complex, because unlike nuclear power reactors, most of these facilities are in fact unique. There are thus few baseline requirements or other facilities with which a comparison can be easily made. Examination of these periodic safety reviews confirmed the pertinence of an upstream definition, in the “guidance” phase, of the priority subjects for examination by the licensee during the periodic safety review, along with the associated methodologies, such as the probabilistic analyses which could enhance the safety cases. The periodic safety review of plant UP2-800 (BNI 117) ended in 2024 with ASN issuing technical requirements for the continued operation of this BNI. For plant UP3-A (BNI 116), Orano transmitted its periodic safety review concluding report at the end of 2020, and it will be examined by the Advisory Committee of Experts for Laboratories and Plants (GPU) during the course of several meetings scheduled between 2023 and 2026. In November 2022, following examination of the periodic safety review concluding report for STE3 (BNI 118) and considering that the provisions put in place or planned by the licensee on this point are appropriate, ASN validated continued operation of this facility. With regard to the fresh fuel fabrication plants, the licensee of the Melox plant submitted its periodic safety review concluding report in September 2021. This report (exluding earthquakes) was reviewed by the GPU in June 2024. The report for the periodic safety review of the FBFC and Cerca plants, combined in a single BNI (63-U) by Decree of 23 December 2021, submitted by Framatome in June 2023, will have to be significantly supplemented in 2026 before being examined. With regard to the “fuel cycle” back-end facilities, the periodic safety review of the uranium-bearing materials storage facilities at Tricastin (BNIs 178, 179 and 180) was completed in 2023, with ASN issuing technical requirements for the continued operation of these BNIs. The periodic review of the GB II plant (BNI 168) is currently being HIGHLIGHT No.1 Long-term developments at “fuel cycle” plants Following the Nuclear Policy Council meeting in February 2024, and with a view to continuing the policy of reprocessing spent fuel until the end of this century, Orano and EDF have launched an active review of the sustainability and renewal of “fuel cycle” facilities. An ambitious industrial programme supported by Orano at the La Hague site, known as the “Future Back-End” programme, is being developed to design, build and operate new “fuel cycle” facilities, which will eventually replace the existing ones. The first Safety Option Dossiers (DOS) will be submitted to ASNR by Orano in 2026, starting with the file for a new spent fuel unloading and underwater storage facility, comprising three 6,500-tonne basins. The first basin is scheduled for commissioning in 2040. ASNR considers that the new facilities must be capable of processing, at an industrial scale, all the spent fuel currently stored at La Hague, as well as that which will come from the future operation of the French nuclear fleet and which must be reprocessed. The design of these facilities will therefore have to allow for margins in terms of capacity and process, in order to meet the reprocessing needs of the various energy scenarios that may be decided upon. At the same time, pending the commissioning of the new facilities, it is important to identify now the investment and work needed to ensure that the current facilities continue to operate safely well beyond 2040. This is the aim of the “Continuity – Resilience” programme launched by Orano in 2025. This programme concerns the La Hague facilities, as well as the Melox plant at Marcoule and the TU5 facility at Tricastin. On the basis of the investigations and studies in progress, Orano will present its programme of works to ASNR at the end of 2026, some of which may be the subject of authorisation applications to be examined by ASNR. ASNR is keeping a close eye the progress of the studies and works carried out by Orano, in particular to ensure that the new spent fuel storage facilities are based on a robust and appropriate design framework, with a view to commissioning by 2040. 326 ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025
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