assessment, with the aim of revisiting the guide in 2026. ASNR aims to implement earlier and more progressive oversight of the design and manufacture of NPE, to avoid deviations emerging or being dealt with too late, and by specifying oversight requirements sufficiently far in advance to enable those involved to plan ahead for them and incorporate them within a stable framework. ASNR also reviewed the design of the major components for the main primary system and the main secondary systems of the first EPR 2 reactors up to the beginning of 2026, enabling manufacturers to begin production. In the light of operating experience feedback from the construction of the Flamanville EPR, ASNR reiterates the importance of guaranteeing the quality of components for future EPR 2 reactors, and continued its inspections of the supply chain for safety-important equipment. These inspections enabled oversight of the manufacturing processes that the suppliers used, their organisational provisions, the implementation of the licensee’s requirements within the subcontracting chain, and the supervision that EDF is required to carry out. ASNR considers that the support work carried out by EDF must be continued so that the entire sector, which still has weaknesses, reaches the level of quality and rigour required by the issues at stake. Finally, as part of an early-stage review specific to the project to build a pair of EPR 2 reactors at Gravelines (Nord département), where the ground is relatively soft over a significant depth, ASNR identified points requiring particular attention regarding the foundation design. Based on new information provided by EDF concerning detailed geotechnical knowledge of the site’s subsoil and the design of the foundations, the investigation of this issue will continue in 2026. ENSURING THE LONG-TERM SAFETY OVERSIGHT OF THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FLEET IN OPERATION 2025 was marked by the startup and power increase of the Flamanville EPR, which were subject to specific oversight by ASNR teams. The transition from managing a construction worksite to operation of a reactor was characterised by numerous events, none of which had a major impact on nuclear safety. For the first refuelling outage, EDF plans an ambitious programme of inspection and equipment replacement activities, starting in autumn 2026. ASNR is currently considering the corresponding modification requests. Regarding the Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) affecting some auxiliary piping systems in reactors currently in operation, EDF’s inspections continued, and have so far detected more than 80 significant cracks, some of which call into question the mechanical strength of the piping. ASNR currently considers the situation to be under control, as EDF has identified sensitive piping, and has at its disposal effective non-destructive testing capabilities, as well as, where necessary, techniques for replacement of the affected sections of piping. Against this backdrop, EDF has proposed a long-term monitoring strategy for the piping concerned, on which ASNR will state its position in 2026. ASNR considers that EDF must, in parallel, further improve its understanding of the conditions under which stress corrosion cracking occurs. As of 1 January 2026, 25 of the 56 nuclear power reactors currently in operation (excluding the Flamanville EPR) have exceeded 40 years of operation, which was the design lifetime for certain of their components. Continuing to operate them means managing the ageing of their components, adapting to changes in operating conditions (due to climate change, etc.), and making improvements to bring their safety level closer to that of the most recent reactors. This safety level has been defined based on experience feedback from major nuclear accidents. The experience acquired during the assessment of the fourth Periodic Safety Reviews of the 900 MWe reactors, the oldest in the fleet, enabled ASNR to state an opinion on the conditions for continued operation of the 20 1,300 MWe reactors up to a 50-year lifetime in July 2025, i.e. sufficiently in advance of the first associated ten-yearly outage, which began at the Paluel nuclear power plant in January 2026. The oldest 900 MWe reactor will undergo its fifth ten-yearly outage in 2029. As part of the stabilised safety objectives, the fifth Periodic Safety Review of the 900 MWe reactors will focus, according to the guidelines defined in 2025, on maintaining the compliance of facilities and addressing climate change. Finally, in an energy context that suggests interest in the longterm life extension of reactors, ASNR has, since 2023, favoured the adoption of a generic approach, together with EDF, to anticipate the effects of ageing, mainly in non-replaceable components, likely to affect the possibility of operating reactors over 60 years of age in complete safety, and to identify possible levers for remediation. Following a review of the documents that EDF provided and a technical dialogue with the stakeholders, ASNR will issue an opinion at the end of 2026. In addition, the inspections carried out by ASNR in 2025 show that EDF still needs to make progress in a number of areas, such as preparation of maintenance activities, management of spare parts and the quality of supervision of subcontracted activities, to ensure the long-term operation of the fleet. 6 ABSTRACTS – ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025
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