Assessment of the Orano site In 2025, ASNR considered that the performance of the Orano Recyclage La Hague facility is satisfactory with regard to nuclear safety, environmental protection and radiation protection. With regard to nuclear safety, ASNR found the proficiency of operational management to be satisfactory. In the context of organisational changes linked to the “Convergence” project, ASNR notes positively the work carried out to take account of operational experience feedback from the first phase of this project and the measures taken to improve working conditions within the shared control rooms. However, it is expected that actions will be taken to ensure that operating documents are physically present at predefined locations on the facilities and that they are maintained. ASNR also considers that action needs to be taken to improve the management of alarm inhibitions and equipment unavailability. With regard to periodic inspections, ASNR considers that monitoring needs to be stepped up to correct any discrepancies that may have been observed in 2025 in connection with the inhibition actions required to carry out the inspections, the definition of the technical inspection, the validation period, the documentary integration of material modifications, and the monitoring of non-compliant inspections. ASNR is pleased to note that an organisation is being set up to improve the preparation and monitoring of outages. However, with regard to technological obsolescence, ASNR considers that more should be done to identify replacement parts for safety-critical equipment. On a broader level, with continued operation of the La Hague plants now envisaged beyond 2040, Orano has launched a programme called “Continuity-Resilience”, the scope and objectives of which go beyond the maintenance programme and the monitoring of ageing during re-examinations. In 2025, Orano continued the ramp-up of this programme that began in 2024. ASNR notes that considerable work has been done to identify equipment at risk, but that this work is still in its early stages and needs to be consolidated and accompanied by a strengthening of the baseline requirements, databases and traceability. ASNR considers that the organisation in place for monitoring outside contractors is operational, but that there is room for improvement in terms of the level of detail of the monitoring and surveillance plans and their application at workshop level, the thoroughness with which the monitoring reports are completed and the monitoring of subcontractors of Orano’s outside contractors. In terms of fire risk management, ASNR notes positively the good participation of staff in the exercises carried out by the inspectors. However, improvements are expected in order to correct the discrepancies observed in the management of fire loads and sectorisation breaks during construction work, without any formalised analysis. Similarly, the actions undertaken to identify, justify or correct deviations from standards in terms of the maintenance and periodic inspections of equipment used to control the risk of fire should be continued. In 2025, a fire occurred in a controlled area during decommissioning operations in the MAPu workshop. Lessons must be learnt from this experience in terms of fire risk analysis and response. With regard to radiation protection and significant events reported in this area, ASNR notes that human factors are predominant, without calling into question the organisation currently defined. With regard to the management of sealed sources, ASNR considers that the operator should consolidate the monitoring of radioactive sources in service and ensure that it takes steps to comply with the action plan for the disposal of sealed sources that are no longer in service and/or have expired. In addition, the ongoing modernisation and widespread digitalisation of the tools used for radiation protection represent a major development, and ASNR will therefore remain vigilant regarding the human and material consequences that these numerous changes may entail. With regard to environmental protection in 2025, ASNR has noted several events that led to limit values for discharges from the plant into the natural environment being exceeded. The technical and organisational measures to ensure compliance with the requirements need to be strengthened, particularly within the effluent treatment process at BNI 118. ASNR also notes that actions aimed at strengthening the definition and ownership of non-radiological risk control measures at the facility must be continued, in line with the various observations made during the review of the updated hazard study. In addition, all the actions initiated as part of the analysis of the event involving a nitric acid leak from a reagent tank farm in 2024 should be implemented at facility level, and their effectiveness assessed. ASNR continued to examine the progress of the actions undertaken with a view to returning the Moulinets dam hydraulic structure to nominal operation. In 2024, ASN gave Orano Recyclage formal notice to comply with the regulatory provisions for restoring the state of the dam’s facilities. Following this review, ASNR considers that the actions implemented by Orano meet the requirements of the formal notice, but that a detailed assessment of operational experience feedback should be produced in the medium term. ASNR notes that the organisation of external and internal transport of radioactive substances remains satisfactory. In terms of events, ASNR notes that the situation is broadly similar to 2024 for transport on public roads, but that there has been a significant increase in events for internal transport. In particular, ASNR notes the recurrence of events linked to the faulty closure of containers in certain types of package and to deficiencies in package traceability or location tracking. These discrepancies have already been noted in the past and require action on the part of Orano. In addition, the licensee has finalised the implementation of improvements to the internal transport systems based on the EMEM model. However, the licensee complained of operating difficulties arising from the longer transit times in the facilities. To overcome this, Orano implemented a new internal transport system called “EMICA” for less radioactive content. Operational experience feedback on the implementation of this new process is expected in 2026. ************* During 2025, Orano continued decommissioning operations, including the waste recovery and Waste Retrieval and Packaging (WRP) for the UP2-400 industrial complex at the La Hague site. However, two significant events during the year – a fire at the bitumen recovery site in the MAPu facility and ground contamination in the SAT/SAR pool hall in the STE2 facility – led to site stoppages and delays in decommissioning projects. Generally speaking, the decommissioning project for the HAPF facility and the Silo 130 RCD project, which concern facilities that make a major contribution to the dispersible inventory that can be mobilised in the event of an incident at the UP2-400 industrial complex being decommissioned, were further delayed in 2025: • The rinsing of equipment in the HAPF facility, which is a prerequisite for its decommissioning, could not again be carried out this year because of Orano’s delay in sending the technical information required to extend operation of the facility’s evaporators beyond the regulatory deadline of the end of 2024. This authorisation was signed by ASNR on 25 November 2025. • The target number of solid waste drums taken from silo 130 will not be achieved for 2025 due to further equipment failures, despite the technical and organisational measures implemented as part of the reliability project. ASNR considers that Orano must continue its efforts to improve the preventive maintenance of the installations in order to guarantee a nominal production rate enabling completion of solid waste retrieval by the end of 2027, an operational deadline with no margin. Difficulties have also been seemingly encountered with the subsequent stages of the project, in particular the forthcoming effluent recovery phase, which is also contributing to delays in reducing the source term in the facility. The schedule is currently being consolidated. With regard to the HAO silo, where the target for the start of recovery operations is now set at 2032 at the latest, new equipment was integrated into the recovery cell in 2025. The mechanical equipment delivery indicator improved, but is still below target. ASNR also notes that the search for a new supplier for the bottom-of-silo waste retrieval system introduces uncertainty to the deadline for resuming testing. More generally, a consolidation of the schedule is underway for prioritisation purposes. ASNR is also pleased to note the progress made in operations in the north-west zone of the La Hague site, with regard to the completion of the decommissioning of the ECH pits, the projects for pit 2 and the investigation site for trench C’, with a transition to detailed design studies ahead of development work scheduled for 2026. As regards the Parc aux ajoncs in particular, Orano will have to take all the necessary steps to avoid delaying the clean-up operations. As part of a safety review, Orano has undertaken to deconstruct the upper floors of the MAPu facility to eliminate interactions between this facility and the BST1 facility in the event of an earthquake. On this project, ASNR noted favourably the completion of asbestos removal, masonry work and civil engineering treatment, as well as delicensing checks for transfer to the teams in charge of dismantling at the end of 2025. Also in connection with a safety review, ASN issued resolution 2019-CD-0673 of 25 June 2019, a requirement to cease using the so-called “active” firstgeneration channels at the UP2-400 plant for plant operation after the end of 2024. As Orano failed to meet this commitment, ASNR issued a formal notice on 1 July 2025 setting out the deadlines for compliance. Although interface management has been strengthened as part of the overall decommissioning of the UP2400 complex, the licensee will have to pay particular attention to the interfaces between decommissioning and one-off modifications to the installations. With regard to through-life support of facilities being decommissioned, ASNR considers that Orano should eliminate infiltrations into the HAO South facility and continue the approach initiated in 2024 to analyse the performance of periodic inspections and tests for equipment within the decommissioning perimeter. Normandie 78 ABSTRACTS – ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy NjQ0NzU=