reactor fuels. It will also allow the production of artificial radionuclides for nuclear medicine. Its power is limited to 100 MWth. Construction and equipment manufacturing activities for the JHR continued in 2025, with a significant increase in activity on site. ASNR conducted four inspections in 2025. The process of qualification or examination of documentary compliance, contract management and supervision of outside contractors were all covered, with checks on the licensee’s general organisation and its application to specific technical subjects. The processing of deviations and the qualification of various protection important components, the preparation for the supply of fuel elements or experimental equipment, as well as the repair of heat exchangers between the reactor’s primary and secondary circuits, were also monitored. The revision of the facility’s safety analysis report, to be submitted in 2021 and taking into account the changes and modifications made since construction began, is still undergoing reviews in certain areas to prepare for future commissioning. In 2025, ASNR concluded its review of the areas relating in particular to the overall safety analysis approach, the architecture of the backup cooling circuits and ultimate systems, and the approach to internal fire risk control. In 2025, ASNR also initiated expert assessments on issues such as fuel plate qualification and criticality risk management. The request to amend DAC 2009-1219‑ of 12 October 2009, to extend the commissioning date to 14 October 2037 at the latest, taking into account margins for the project, was finalised in 2025, with a draft decree sent to the licensee at the end of the year. ASNR considers that the project is well organised and monitored, allowing for an effective assessment. However, certain issues deserve greater attention, in particular document traceability for document approval processes or qualification monitoring, or the carrying out of certain repairs. The late detection of certain deviations should also raise questions about the adequacy and quality of supervision. Greater vigilance is therefore expected from the project teams, particularly in view of the increase in site activities and equipment supply. Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur Assessment of the CEA Cadarache Centre In 2025, ASNR considered that the level of nuclear safety at the CEA Cadarache centre remained broadly satisfactory. In terms of meeting commitments, ASNR notes the recurrent postponement of certain actions in the action plans arising from facility safety reviews, as well as certain decommissioning operations. With regard to the monitoring of outsourced protection important activities, ASNR observes that progress has been made in integrating lessons learned from previous exercises, enabling a more targeted selection of oversight actions. However, given the large volume of protection important activities entrusted to outside contractors, CEA will have to maintain this momentum in 2026. ASNR also notes that some of the oversight activities carried out in situ are not systematically documented and recorded in the oversight programmes, which limits the use of operational experience feedback. With regard to Periodic Inspections and Tests (CEP), ASNR notes favourably the progress made in revising maintenance procedures. However, recurrent inspection findings reveal that the operating procedures and maintenance ranges do not always exhaustively specify the decisive criteria to be checked, to ensure that inspections or tests comply with the safety analysis requirements. Deviations were also noted in terms of traceability, particularly with regard to the technical controls of these operations and the clear identification of all those involved in the CEP. ASNR also identified shortcomings in the management of obsolescence affecting certain Protection Important Components (PICs), which require refurbishment work to ensure the long-term sustainability of their functions. With regard to the management of hardware modifications, ASNR noted in 2025 that several impact analyses relating to the implementation of modifications to installations were not sufficiently detailed. These analyses did not systematically highlight the need to reclassify PICs. In addition, they have not always identified the need to carry out post-modification checks to ensure that it has not degraded the operation of a PIC or of elements whose presence, operation or failure is likely to affect the operation or integrity of a PIC. This led to a number of significant events in 2025, including the unavailability of power supplies for PICs. With regard to the management of nuclear safety-related deviations, ASNR notes traceability issues, particularly for discrepancies detected during the safety review process, which are not systematically archived in accordance with regulatory provisions and CEA’s integrated management system. This situation can compromise the use of operational experience feedback. In addition, the failure to report certain deviations and the lack of experience sharing may also have led to significant events. ASNR also notes that there is still room for improvement in the sharing of operational experience feedback between the centre’s facilities, particularly on common issues such as the reprocessing and packaging of liquid waste during decommissioning. The decommissioning and waste management strategy deployed by CEA remains a subject on which ASNR is extremely vigilant. ASNR notes favourably the continued reduction in the dispersible inventory that can be mobilised in the event of an accident and the progress made on clean-up work at facilities being decommissioned. ASNR has also noted postponements in the monitoring and surveillance phase planned for certain facilities, which requires an assessment of their impact on overall decommissioning schedules. The discovery of civil engineering faults at BNI 37-A in 2024 confirmed the fragility of CEA’s MA-VL waste processing route organisation, which relies on single facilities. CEA will have to propose a long-term solution to guarantee the robustness of the waste management route. As regards environmental protection, ASNR notes that the level remains fairly satisfactory, but that improvements are still expected. Managing rainwater and historically contaminated soils remains a major challenge. CEA has made progress in maintaining the piezometric structures needed to characterise groundwater, in remediating existing structures and in the network verification programme aimed at preventing groundwater contamination. ASNR expects CEA to implement a policy for managing contaminated sites and soils. The integration of all the impacts of the centre’s facilities, and more broadly of the platform as a whole, taking into account all the licensees, in the impact assessments of the BNIs, remains a point of attention. The review of the amendment to the centre’s discharge permits, aimed at incorporating changes to the BNIs since 2016, continued in 2025. With regard to new facilities, ASNR notes that work on the Jules Horowitz reactor is being carried out rigorously, despite the fact that implementation is taking longer than initially planned. ASNR also notes that CEA has finalised the new contractual agreement for the takeover of the CIRCE project for the construction of a emergency management building. It will pay particular attention to the progress of the works, so as to have an emergency response facility that can withstand extreme events as soon as possible. In the field of radiation protection, ASNR takes a positive view of CEA Cadarache’s approach to the disposal of disused sealed radioactive sources. The Cadarache site has taken into account the latest regulatory developments applicable to the management of radioactive sources within the BNIs. However, ASNR is waiting for clarification of the overall strategy for disposing of disused sealed sources, with a detailed schedule, and for the administrative situation of certain sources to be regularised. With regard to internal radioactive substance transport, the inspections carried out in 2025 confirmed compliance with the regulations in force. ABSTRACTS – ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025 95
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