LES ACTIVITÉS NUCLÉAIRES : RAYONNEMENTS IONISANTS ET RISQUES POUR LA SANTÉ ET L’ENVIRONNEMENT ∙WGSUP held a joint meeting with members of KELPO, a Finnish industry project for developing commercial quality equipment purchasing practices. The meeting, held in Finland, focused on a step-by-step approach to the use of standard industrial items in NPP safety applications. ∙Lastly, at the World Nuclear Exhibition, a major event in the civil nuclear sector that brings together all the players in the industry 5. Letter available on the website https://www.asn.fr/l-asn-informe/actualites/l-asn-fait-le-point-sur-les-actions-engagees-face-au-risque-de-fraudes. every two years, ASNR, who was invited alongside international organisations, took part in two round tables, the aim of which was to engage with professionals on the issues facing all the stakeholders and to share its objectives in the service of public and environmental protection. 7 – Inspections concerning counterfeit, falsifications and suspected fraud, and processing of reported cases 7.1 Inspections concerning counterfeit, falsifications and suspected fraud Since 2015, several cases of irregularities that could be considered to be falsifications have been brought to light at known manufacturers, suppliers or organisations who have, in some cases, been working for many years on behalf of the French nuclear industry. Confirmed cases of counterfeit or falsification have also been encountered in a number of other countries in recent years. The term of irregularity was initially employed by ASNR to cover any intentional modification, alteration or omission of certain information or data. ASNR has adopted the term of “Counterfeit, Falsification or Suspected Fraud” (CFS), which is better suited to the issue as it is more in line with the term usually employed internationally: Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Items (CFSI). A CFS detected by ASNR can be characterised by a judge in a case of criminal fraud. The number of confirmed or suspected cases remains few in number but they are a reality, despite the high level of quality demanded in the nuclear industry and the robustness of the monitoring and inspection chain, the key links of which are the manufacturers, suppliers and licensees. The licensees have improved their monitoring and therefore the detection of CFS. They must however maintain their efforts to adapt their monitoring methods more adequately to the prevention, detection, analysis and processing of cases of CFS. As early as 2016, ASNR began to look at adapting BNI inspection methods in an irregularity context. In so doing, it questioned other regulation and oversight administrations, its foreign counterparts and the licensees with regard to their practices, in order to learn from the OEF. This particular risk gave rise to changes to ASNR’s oversight methods (specific checkpoints, dedicated governance bodies, development of awareness of licensees and suppliers, etc.). The existing framework is used for processing. In 2018(5), ASN also reminded the BNI licensees and the main manufacturers of nuclear equipment that a CFS is a deviation as defined by the BNI Order. The requirements of the Order therefore apply to the prevention, detection and processing of cases of CFS. More generally, the regulatory requirements concerning the safety and protection of persons against the risks related to ionising radiation also apply. For example, applying a signature to certify that an activity has been correctly carried out, whereas in reality it has not, could – depending on the circumstances – be a breach of the rules of organisation, technical inspection of activities, skills management, etc. For a number of years now the CFS search has become one of the usual inspection practices and specific internal tools have been made available to the inspectors. Incorporating CFS into inspections corresponds to three contexts: ∙inspections further to known subjects, resulting from CFS discovered in other facilities, or to monitor the processing of a case previously detected; ∙inspections including, among the areas being controlled, an in-depth search for proof in the performance of activities with high safety stakes, for example with verification of the actual presence of a person who certified that they had carried out an activity on a given date, or the examination of inspection registration source data; ∙inspections with the purpose of raising awareness concerning the risks of CFS, notably during supplier inspections, where the risk of CFS in the subcontracting chain is dealt with. More than 120 inspections of this type were carried out in 2025. They mainly took place on nuclear sites and at manufacturers of equipment intended for use there. Inspections devoted to this topic were also carried out in the head office departments of the main nuclear licensees. The cases detected are first of all dealt with as deviations from the regulatory requirements. They are also the subject of discussions with the site management and the head office departments of the licensees, so that preventive action can be taken. Depending on the stakes involved, a reminder letter, formal notice or violation report may be issued. In the event of an offence, a report is made to the Public Prosecutor, who is responsible for deciding whether to prosecute (Article 40 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). In 2025, ASNR issued a report following an alert. When the Public Prosecutor initiates investigations, ASNR provides, upon request, support for the investigators appointed by the legal authorities for technical analysis of documents and to facilitate dealings with the nuclear licensees. As this is a priority issue, an inspection campaign has been carried out on all BNIs for the period 2024 and 2025. It focused on the organisations in place in the facilities for the prevention and treatment of CFS. The inspections of this campaign, focusing on human and organisational factors, included numerous interviews with the various stakeholders within the facilities, from the hierarchy responsible for CFS aspects down to the operatives performing various works in the facilities. As this inspection campaign was carried out until the end of 2025, it will soon be the subject of specific OEF. Between the start and the end of this campaign, there has already been a marked improvement in the way licensees and their subcontractors take account of the risk of CFS, in terms of internal procedures, training, and the detection and handling of cases. However, there are still disparities in the implementation of prevention, detection and handling processes, as well as in the robustness with which warning signs are taken into account. In addition, the question of data integrity – that is ensuring that data has not been modified or destroyed without authorisation – linked to the risk of CFS, given that shortcomings in traceability can facilitate irregularities, continued to be frequently addressed and formed the subject of requirements in several inspection follow-up letters. In 2025, ASNR worked with licensees to better define its expectations, and took part in numerous meetings with industry players to listen to their difficulties, promote good practice and participate in the general prevention approach. ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025 171 01 02 03 05 09 06 10 07 11 13 04 08 12 A / Z
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy NjQ0NzU=