LES ACTIVITÉS NUCLÉAIRES : RAYONNEMENTS IONISANTS ET RISQUES POUR LA SANTÉ ET L’ENVIRONNEMENT New CFS are still being regularly detected, both by the licensees, within the context of their monitoring and internal checks, and by ASNR’S inspectors. In 2025, 120 were examined by ASNR, whether suspected cases, proven cases or cases finally cleared after analysis. This number remains stable compared with 2024, and the sharp increase in the number of cases compared with 2023 can be explained by the following factors: ∙the licensees, EDF in particular, continued to implement their CFS prevention, detection and processing actions. The inspections they carried out resulted in improved detection; ∙ASNR’s inspection campaign on CFS (see Tables 14 and 15) enabled inspectors to detect CFS, but also to gather more information from licensees and encourage them to speed up the implementation of their strategy to combat CFS; ∙greater publicity concerning the ASNR whistle-blower system (see point 7.2) leads to new cases being identified; ∙ASNR inspections of licensees’ subcontracting chains systematically include checkpoints on CFS risk control. CFS cases are being followed-up and processed in close collaboration with the licensees and manufacturers. The CFS typology in 2025 can be presented as follows: ∙71 concern cases specific to a facility, with no potential generic component (action signed off as done but absence in controlled area, falsification of performance of an activity or training, etc.); ∙32 cases concern suppliers for which investigations were needed to check the absence of CFS, expanded to several licensees or suppliers (untraced or hidden weld repairs, supply of parts outside traceability circuit by “brokers”, falsification of technical inspection records, etc.); ∙10 cases illustrate the potential for CFS to be found in an ancillary field such as approved or certified bodies: falsification of certification as an RPO, falsification of training provision, acting as an approved body for radon measurements without holding the required approval (see point 2.3); ∙7 were cases identified through monitoring by ASNR staff of foreign news (manufacture of components, significant event, modification of document, etc.). Most of them lead to discussions with the licensees and manufacturers. Tables 14 and 15 show the number of cases recorded by ASNR. The disparities between areas or sectors of activity are mainly due to the difference in maturity of the processes for preventing, detecting and dealing with CFS. ASNR’s actions to prevent, detect and process CFS are not limited just to the inspections. For example, ASNR informs the main licensees and manufacturers of the cases detected and analyses their responses. It holds bilateral discussions or inspection crossobservations with foreign safety regulators, through an international exchange channel that it actively helped to set up. In 2025, ASNR accompanied its ONR counterparts on an inspection of a manufacturer of components for construction in the UK. In addition, ASNR is making the suppliers aware of this. A specific informative guide (available in English and French) intended for the nuclear sector suppliers was published in 2024(6). One part of it is devoted to CFS. Communication regarding cases of CFS dealt with by ASNR could compromise other secret information protected by law, notably guarantees of strict confidentiality surrounding the authors of cases reported, the persons or companies involved, any third party mentioned and information collected by all recipients. ASNR thus handles all these subjects confidentially and communicates no details. 6. Practice guide available at https://regulation-oversight.asnr.fr/regulation/asnr-guides/guide-to-design-and-manufacturing-requirements-intended-forequipment-suppliers-and-their-subcontractors 7.2 Processing of reported cases At the end of November 2018, ASNR set up a portal to enable anyone wishing to notify it of irregularities potentially affecting the protection of persons and the environment (whistle-blower) to do so. Act 2022-401 of 21 March 2022 aimed at improving the protection of whistle-blowers, which amends the system devised by the so-called “Sapin 2 Act” of 9 December 2016, came into force on 1 September 2022. It is supplemented by Constitutional Act 2022‑400 of the same date, aimed at strengthening the role of the Defender of Rights in terms of whistleblowing. These two Acts reinforce the whistle-blower protection system. They transpose Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of 23 October 2019 defining a common framework for this protection and take it even further. A broader definition of whistle-blower, simplification of the alert procedures, reinforcement of the whistle-blower protections, a new status for the entourage of the whistle-blower and an expansion of the roles of the Defender of Rights with regard to whistleblowing are the main contributions of these Acts. Furthermore, Decree 2022‑1284 of 3 October 2022 relative to the procedures for collecting and processing alerts submitted by whistle-blowers and setting out the list of external authorities instituted by the abovementioned Act 2022‑401 supplements these provisions by detailing the whistle-blowing report processing mechanisms. This Decree designated ASN, now ASNR, as having competence to process whistle-blower alerts regarding radiation protection and nuclear safety. The system set up by ASNR, which was originally voluntary, has been added to and meets these obligations. By means of a system of pseudonyms for the reports received, ASNR guarantees the confidentiality of anyone sending it a report. Only a request from a judicial authority could override this confidentiality, something which has never yet happened. It is however preferable for the person sending in the notification to leave their contact details so that ASNR can: ∙acknowledge receipt of the notification; ∙contact them if clarification is required (this is frequently the case); ∙inform them if action has been taken following their alert. In 2025, 89 reports were sent to ASNR: 60 % via the whistle-blower portal, the others by alternative means of transmission, mainly (21 reports) by direct contact with the ASNR division geographically competent or the technical department in charge of the subject. The reports received vary: ∙the field related to: approximately one fifth relates to BNIs, one fifth to the medical field and one fifth to industrial nuclear activities; ∙their content: they can report CFS in the manufacturing plants, deterioration in the organisation of the entity which could affect radiation protection, poorly performed work, falsified reports, etc. After a steady increase in the number of reports received up to 2023, a significant increase was noted in 2024 (about +50%) and became more pronounced in 2025. A rising number of reports led to one or more in-depth interviews with their author. Apart from the general publicity given to whistleblowers, no additional factors were identified by ASNR compared with last year. The biggest increase in 2025 will be in industrial nuclear activities. However, these are low-stakes cases, such as discrepancies in the management of old Ionisation Chamber Smoke Detectors (ICSDs). 172 ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025
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