LES ACTIVITÉS NUCLÉAIRES : RAYONNEMENTS IONISANTS ET RISQUES POUR LA SANTÉ ET L’ENVIRONNEMENT 1.1.3 – The response to other radiological emergency situations Apart from the incidents or accidents which could affect nuclear installations or radioactive substances transport operations, radiological emergency situations can also occur: ∙during performance of a nuclear activity for medical, research or industrial purposes; ∙in the event of intentional or inadvertent dispersal of radioactive substances into the environment; ∙if radioactive sources are discovered in places where they are not supposed to be. In such cases, intervention is necessary to limit the risk of human exposure to ionising radiation. Together with the Ministries and the parties concerned, ASNR therefore drafted Circular DGSNR/DHOS/ DDSC 2005/1390 of 23 December 2005 relative to the principles of intervention in the case of an event that could lead to a radiological emergency, other than situations covered by a contingency plan or an emergency response plan. This Circular supplements the provisions of the Interministerial Directive of 7 April 2005 on the action of the public authorities in the case of an event leading to a radiological emergency situation presented in point 1.3 and defines the methods for the organisation of the State services in these situations. Given the large number of potential originators of an alert and the corresponding alert circuits, all the alerts are centralised in a single location, which then distributes them to all the players: the centralising body is the fire brigade’s centralised alert processing centre Codis-CTA (Département Operational Fire and Emergency Centre – Alert Processing Centre), that can be reached by calling 18 or 112. The management of accidents of malicious origin occurring outside BNIs is not covered by this Circular, but by the Government’s NRBC Pirate plan (Nuclear, Radiological, Biological and Chemical). 1.1.4 – Controlling urban development around nuclear sites The aim of controlling urban development is to limit the consequences of an accident for the population and property. A similar approach has been in place for non-nuclear industrial facilities since 1987, and has been stepped up since the accident at the AZF factory in Toulouse in 2001. Act 2006-686 of 13 June 2006 on nuclear transparency and security on nuclear matters (known as the “TSN Act”, now codified in Books I and V of the Environment Code), enables the public authorities to control urban development around nuclear installations by introducing urban planning restrictions or prohibiting new construction near these facilities. The actions to control urban development entail a division of responsibilities between the licensee, the mayors and the State: ∙the licensee is responsible for its activities and the related risks; ∙the mayor is responsible for producing the urban planning documents and issuing building permits; ∙the Prefect informs the mayors of the existing risks, verifies the legality of the steps taken by the local authorities and may impose institutional controls as necessary. ASNR supplies technical data in order to characterise the risk, and offers the Prefect its assistance in the urban development control process. The current approach to controlling activities around nuclear facilities exclusively concerns those subject to a PPI and primarily aims to preserve the operational nature of the contingency plans, in particular for sheltering and evacuation, while limiting the population numbers concerned as far as possible. It focuses on the PPI “reflex” zone, determined by the Circular of 10 March 2000 revising the PPIs for BNIs, the pertinence of which was confirmed by the assessment of 3 October 2016. In this “reflex” zone, immediate steps to protect the population are taken in the event of a rapidly developing accident (see point 1.1.1 b). A 17 February 2010 Circular from the Ministry responsible for the Environment concerning the control of activities in the vicinity of BNIs liable to present dangers off the site asked the Prefects to exercise increased vigilance with regard to urban development in the vicinity of nuclear facilities. This Circular states that the greatest possible attention must be paid to projects that are sensitive owing to their size, their purpose, or the difficulties they could entail in terms of protection of the general public in the “reflex” zone. ASNR is consulted on construction or urban development projects situated within this zone. The opinions issued are based on the principles explained in ASNR Guide No. 15 on the control of activities around BNIs published in 2016. This Guide, drawn up by a multi-disciplinary working group co-supervised by ASN and the Directorate General for Risk Prevention (DGPR), and involving elected representatives and the National Association of Local Information Committees and Commissions (Anccli), is based on the following objectives: ∙preserve the operational nature of the contingency plans; ∙give priority to regional development outside the “reflex” zone; ∙allow controlled development that meets the needs of the resident population. 1.2 The emergency situation players The response by the public authorities to a major nuclear or radiological accident is determined by a number of texts concerning nuclear safety, radiation protection, public order and civil protection, as well as by the emergency plans. Act 2004-811 of 13 August 2004 on the Modernisation of Civil Protection, makes provision for an updated inventory of risks, an overhaul of operational planning, performance of exercises involving the general public, information and training of the general public, an operational watching brief and alert procedures. A number of Decrees implementing this Act, codified in the Domestic Security Code in Articles L. 741-1 to L. 741-32, relating in particular to Orsec and PPI plans, were added in 2005. How radiological emergency situations are dealt with is specified in the Interministerial Directive of 7 April 2005 on the action of the public authorities in the case of an event leading to a radiological emergency situation (see Diagram 1). Thus, at the national level, ASNR is an active participant in interministerial work on nuclear emergency management. The Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident showed that it was necessary to improve preparation for the occurrence of a multi-faceted accident (natural disaster, accident affecting several facilities simultaneously). The response organisations thus put into place must be robust and capable of managing a large-scale emergency over a long period of time. Better advance planning must be carried out for work done under ionising radiation and, in order to provide effective support for the country affected, international relations must be improved. 180 ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025
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