LES ACTIVITÉS NUCLÉAIRES : RAYONNEMENTS IONISANTS ET RISQUES POUR LA SANTÉ ET L’ENVIRONNEMENT Causes of events The recurring causes of the significant events notified in 2025 include the following: ∙Radiopharmaceutical products delivery errors, with no real consequences, as the drugs delivered are appreciably the same. Most of them could therefore be used with no impact on patient treatment or on the environment. ∙Non-conformities affecting a package: these mainly relate to labelling errors (mistakes or omissions) or marking issues. There are also a number of deviations from the package safety file, the package operating manual and the package maintenance specifications. These events had no actual consequences for safety or radiation protection. ∙The presence of surface contamination spots exceeding the regulatory limits, detected in particular on the under-wagon water collection pans of conveyances having been used to transport spent fuel packages or on the outer surface of packagings (containers or cases) having served to transport contaminated material or contaminated tooling or natural uranium. These events had very little impact on radiation protection of the public, who cannot have access to the contaminated areas. ∙Finally, cases where the regulation dose rate limit of the packages was slightly exceeded, leading to errors in the categorisation of packages. These events had no actual consequences for the radiation protection of workers, the public or the environment. The EITs reported to ASNR are primarily deviations relating to incorrect labelling of packages (consignee or consignor not mentioned), vehicle signage or errors in the transport documentation. There were also deviations consisting in the detection of foreign objects in empty packagings or slight damage to packages. These events have been classified as relevant to transport because the vast majority of them concern excepted or exempted packages, with little at stake and few regulatory requirements to be met. As for the on-site transport significant events reported, these concerned delivery errors (receipt of a full package when it was expected to be empty, or receipt of the package in the wrong workshop), traffic incidents (tipping of a package with the forks of a forklift truck, uncoupling of a trailer from its tractor) or deviations from the package’s compliance file or labelling. These events had no actual consequences for the radiation protection of workers, the public or the environment. 4.3 Participation in drawing up the regulations applicable to the transport of radioactive substances 4.3.1 – Participation in the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency ASNR represents France on the IAEA’s Transport Safety Standards Committee (TRANSSC), which brings together experts from all countries and reviews the IAEA safety standards constituting the basis of regulations concerning the transport of radioactive substances. With a view to constant improvement of safety levels, ASNR notably played an active part in drafting the 2025 edition of this document, SSR‑6. In 2026, it will support work to update the IAEA Guide to the Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (SSG-26). 4.3.2 – Participation in drafting of national regulations ASNR takes part in the drafting of French regulations relative to the transport of radioactive substances. These regulations mainly consist of the Order of 29 May 2009 and the Orders of 23 November 1987 concerning the safety of ships and of 18 July 2000 concerning the transport and handling of dangerous materials in sea ports. ASNR therefore sits on the CSPRT, which is called on to issue an opinion on any draft regulation for the transport of dangerous goods by rail, road and inland waterway. ASNR is also consulted by the Ministry responsible for transport when a modification of the three Orders mentioned above can have an impact on the transport of radioactive substances. HIGHLIGHT No. 4 SSR-6 2025 edition (revision No. 2) At the end of 2025, the IAEA published a new version of regulation SSR-6 on the safe transport of radioactive substances. This edition, accompanied by seven security guides, defines the international requirements applicable to all modes of transport and incorporated into the main international and national regulations. The main change concerns the A1/A2 values, which correspond to the quantities of radioactive materials that can be transported in a Type A or Type B package. These A1/A2 values were last updated in 1996. These new values are the result of work initiated in 2013 on five exposure scenarios reflecting the conditions of an accident during transport. In order to give the industry and package users sufficient time to take account of these new values, which may in some cases lead to the need to use Type B packages instead of Type A packages, a transitional period of ten years has been introduced for the application of the new values to packaging. In this respect, ASNR has identified, in liaison with medical professionals, the possibility that certain new kinds of radioactive medication used in innovative medical treatments in internal targeted radiotherapy (see chapter 5), and presenting high radiological activity, may be required to be transported in type B packages, which are more restrictive operationally than type A packages. The possibility of such a situation should be anticipated, if necessary, so that transport issues are taken into account in innovative treatment development projects. ASNR drew attention to this issue during the consultations conducted by the IAEA at the end of 2025 prior to the publication of the new version of the regulations. HIGHLIGHT No. 3 Operating Experience Feedback from the significant transport events reported between 2021 and 2024 In 2025, ASNR published a report on its website analysing the significant transport events reported to it during the period 20212024. Some of the key events that occurred during this period are presented, together with statistics on significant events reported over the same period. It reveals that many of the incidents could have been prevented and highlights the applicable regulatory requirements for radioactive material transport. ASNR has brought the results of this analysis and its recommendations to the attention of the parties involved (carriers, shippers, freight forwarders, operators, transport safety advisors, etc.), as well as to training organisations for drivers transporting radioactive materials. An English version of the report has also been published. 276 ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025
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