LES ACTIVITÉS NUCLÉAIRES : RAYONNEMENTS IONISANTS ET RISQUES POUR LA SANTÉ ET L’ENVIRONNEMENT Even if there is a slight improvement in the number of significant events and inspections in 2025, certain difficulties relating to the skills management of EDF staff and outside contractors identified in 2024 will persist. The problem of identifying training needs is in the process of being solved through the effective operation of skills committees at all organisational levels, the strengthening of the role of training support staff who provide a link with the training departments, and an increased managerial presence in the field. However, the effectiveness of the training systems remains an issue. ASNR notes that there is a shortage of experienced staff to act as tutors for firsttime operators and new arrivals, and that there is an increase in selftraining practices that do not allow theoretical input to be combined with practical application. ASNR notes that EDF’s approach to bringing «core business» skills back in-house, designed to strengthen technical control of activities and improve supervision, is still very disparate and underused by the sites. In view of the progress made, ASNR considers that EDF should continue its efforts to improve the training and maintenance of workers’ skills. The Independent Safety Organisation During its inspections, ASNR examines the actions of the Independent Safety Organisation (FIS – see Highlight No. 5) and the extent to which its opinions are taken into account by the operational departments. The inspectors note the competence, effectiveness and independence of the FIS. Some sites are still encountering resource problems, with the number of safety engineers often being below the target levels. In 2023, EDF took steps to boost its safety engineer numbers, so that they can calmly perform their independent verification of reactor safety. These measures are gradually improving the situation. Operation in an incident, accident, or severe accident situation ASNR checks the processes to draft and validate the incident or accident operating rules, their pertinence and how they are implemented. ASNR thus carried out several inspections in 2025 on the organisational and technical arrangements made by EDF to deal with an incident and accident situation. These inspections usually include a situational exercise for the facility’s operating teams, to check the application of instructions and intervention and communication practices within these teams. Following these inspections, ASNR considers that the level of preparation of the operating teams to deal with such situations is satisfactory, despite the persistence of a few errors and inaccuracies in the operating documents. ASNR also carried out reactive inspections in 2025 on a number of facilities that suffered incidents requiring reactors to be shut down. With the exception of one event in which the operating team did not faithfully apply the dedicated operating instructions, ASNR considers that the situations generated by these hazards, in particular the massive influx of clogging matter into the heat sink of several reactors, were well managed. Emergency organisation When the situation in the installation deteriorates or additional means are needed to manage the situation, the incident or accident operating procedures provide for activation of the PUI, which leads to deployment of an emergency organisation. In 2025, four NPPs triggered their emergency organisation for a fire outside a nuclear zone, i.e. in an area containing no radioactive substances: on 28 January at Chinon NPP, on 29 May at Bugey NPP, on 6 June at Dampierre-en-Burly NPP and on 20 December at Chooz NPP. The Flamanville NPP also implemented a particular organisation following the detection of a leak in a small-diameter pipe connected to the primary circuit on 22 March, without the On-site Emergency Plan trigger criteria being fulfilled. The NPP reactively applied the relevant instructions and notified the ASNR on-call team. This event had no impact on the environment. These five situations had a limited impact inside the installations and required no population protection measures. In order to test the emergency organisation of EDF and the public authorities, ASNR takes part in national exercises. Of these exercises in 2025, three took place at NPPs (Chinon, Flamanville and Gravelines). HIGHLIGHT No. 4 Complexity of reactor operating baseline requirements The complexity of the operating standards, and in particular the General Operating Rules (RGEs), is regularly highlighted as a possible cause of operators losing a sense of purpose in their work and having negative effects on risk management. It has risen significantly since the reactors first entered service. New accident scenarios have been taken into account, particularly during the fourth periodic safety review of the reactors, which has resulted in the addition of equipment with new operating requirements. To address these findings, EDF began work on short and mediumterm simplification, along with a long-term project for a complete overhaul of its RGEs. EDF aims on the one hand to simplify the baseline operating requirements, using an approach proportionate to the safety issues, to make them more legible and easier to use by the operator, and to guarantee the operability of the installations. In 2024, ASN convened the profession during a brainstorming cycle by the Steering Committee on Social, Organisational and Human Factors (Cofsoh), on the subject of the complexity of activities related to the operation of nuclear facilities. A summary of these sessions was published in 2025 and Cofsoh plans to return in 2026 to the work undertaken since then on this subject. ASNR is also currently supporting preparation of a thesis on the parameters and dynamics of the complexity of reactor safety governance in France. The results of this thesis are expected in 2026. HIGHLIGHT No. 5 The Independent Safety Organisation At EDF, the Independent Safety Organisation (FIS) verifies the actions and decisions taken by the departments in charge of operating the installations, from the viewpoint of safety. At each NPP, the FIS notably comprises safety engineers and auditors, who conduct a daily check on the safety of the reactors. The functioning of each FIS is checked and evaluated at national level by the FIS of EDF’s Nuclear Production Division. Finally, EDF’s internal inspection services, in particular the Inspector General for Nuclear Safety, reporting to the Chairman of the EDF Group and assisted by a team of inspectors, represent the highest level of independent verification of nuclear safety within the EDF Group. 292 ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025
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