LES ACTIVITÉS NUCLÉAIRES : RAYONNEMENTS IONISANTS ET RISQUES POUR LA SANTÉ ET L’ENVIRONNEMENT ASNR also carried out several inspections on the EDF emergency organisation and resources. These inspections, some of which are based on unscheduled situational exercises leading to activation of the site’s emergency organisation, were also an opportunity to test the operational nature of the system on specific subjects (emergency management premises equipment, documentation, training, compliance with processes, etc.). Overall, these exercises and inspections demonstrated that the EDF sites have assimilated the principles of organisation, preparedness and management of emergency situations to the extent that they can take the required action in the event of an emergency. ASNR also underlines the professionalism and motivation of the on-call personnel mobilised. EDF must however continue its efforts concerning monitoring of through-life support for the resources that could be mobilised in an emergency situation, and the corresponding procedures, the practice and training of the emergency crew members. 2.4.3 – The Operating Experience Feedback process It is essential for EDF to take account of OEF from the operation of its installations and those of other licensees if safety is to be continuously improved. This is based on the collection and analysis of events. Significant events are analysed individually. This analysis aims to identify their root causes and the changes required to prevent them from happening again. Analyses of trends and weak signals are regularly performed by EDF to identify the deterioration safety as far upstream as possible. EDF pays particular attention to detecting and analysing potentially generic significant events detected on one reactor, but which could affect others. 2.4.4 – Assessment of the Operating Experience Feedback process The Operating Experience Feedback process ASNR analyses the significant event notifications and reports transmitted by EDF to ensure that they are pertinent. It also carries out inspections on the NPPs to ensure that the OEF process is correctly implemented. The quality and availability of the resources assigned to the in-depth analyses of significant events are satisfactory on all the NPPs, which is a positive point. However, ASNR notes that the involvement of specialists in HOFs is still inadequate and varies from site to site: at some sites, specialists are involved as soon as the facts are gathered and participate in analysing the data and drawing up corrective actions, which is satisfactory; at others, they are only involved at the time of validating or re-reading the analysis. In 2025, ASNR noted that the apparent causes and root causes of significant events, when they concern material or human failures, are generally correctly analysed and dealt with by appropriate measures. However, there is still insufficient investigation of the causes, when they concern the organisation or the work situation. Finally, ASNR considers that EDF needs to make further progress on evaluating the effectiveness of the corrective measures and the conditions for closure of these measures. Building on lessons learned and sharing OEF remain points to be monitored. Notification of significant events by EDF Pursuant to the rules for the declaration of significant events (see chapter 3, point 3.3), ASNR received 784 Significant Safety Event (ESS) reports from EDF in 2025, along with 118 Significant Radiation Protection Event (ESR) reports and 70 Significant Environmental Event (ESE) reports. It should be noted that, since 2021, the significant events at the Fessenheim NPP, which was finally shut down in June 2020, are no longer counted in these results. These results also include operation of the Flamanville EPR reactor which was commissioned in May 2024 (33 ESS, including 5 level 1 in 2025). HIGHLIGHT No. 6 Inspection of the emergency organisation for the Flamanville EPR reactor In March 2025, ASNR carried out a large-scale inspection, involving a dozen inspectors in an unprecedented format, to assess the overall management of an emergency situation at the Flamanville EPR reactor. The purpose of this inspection was to ensure that the organisation and the material, logistical and human resources put in place by EDF to deal with an accident leading to degradation of the installation and requiring the deployment of local emergency teams, are operational and appropriate. The inspection consisted of two parts: • an announced part, based on a scenario not revealed before the inspection, which consisted of testing, on a full-scale simulator, the application and operability of the operating instructions in the event of an accident, • an unannounced part, which involved testing the mobilisation of local emergency teams within the allotted time and verifying the effective flow of information between the various emergency response posts in the event of an On-site Emergency Plan (PUI) being triggered. ASNR took a positive view of the way the accident was managed by the control team in the control room and in the field. The team correctly kept up with developments in the situation despite the fast pace of the scenario. Information sharing within this team was satisfactory and the monitoring activities required by the operational instructions were carried out in accordance with the applicable rules. Nevertheless, shortcomings were noted in the reading and transcription of the plant parameters sent to the emergency teams. The inspectors also identified an area for improvement concerning the initial alert procedures following the activation of the PUI, for which practices to enhance the reliability of interventions should be systematically implemented. The Operational Experience Feedback from this exercise was fully utilised by the licensee, which implemented the measures necessary to address the inspectors’ findings. ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025 293 01 05 02 06 03 07 04 08 09 10 11 13 12 A / Z
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