Normandie The Caen Division regulates nuclear safety, radiation protection and the transport of radioactive substances in the 5 départements of the Normandie region. In 2025, ASNR carried out 232 inspections in Normandie, including 72 in the Flamanville, Paluel and Penly Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) and 19 on the Flamanville EPR reactor, 69 on “fuel cycle”, research or decommissioning facilities, 49 in small-scale nuclear activities, 11 in the field of radioactive substance transport and 12 concerning organisations and laboratories approved by ASNR. In addition to this, 26 days of labour inspection were carried out on the NPP sites and the Flamanville 3 EPR construction site. In 2025, 16 significant events classified at level 1 of the International Nuclear and Radiological Events Scale (INES scale) were reported to ASNR, including 15 on BNIs and 1 in small-scale nuclear activities. Lastly, in the context of their oversight duties, ASNR inspectors issued one violation report. 232 inspections 16 significant events on a level greater than or equal to 1 on the INES scale 0 significant event of level 2 or higher on the ASN-SFRO scale Flamanville nuclear power plant Operated by EDF and situated in the Manche département in the municipality of Flamanville, 25 km south-west of Cherbourg, the Flamanville NPP comprises two 1,300 MWe Pressurised Water Reactors (PWRs), commissioned in 1985 and 1986. Reactor 1 constitutes BNI 108 and reactor 2 BNI 109. ASNR considers that the performance of the Flamanville NPP in terms of nuclear safety and radiation protection is in line with the general assessment of EDF’s NPPs. On the other hand, its environmental performance is considered to be lagging behind the general assessment of EDF’s NPPs. In the area of nuclear safety, ASNR observed a stable situation, with margins for progress identified by the licensee. ASNR considers that several significant events relating to inappropriate actions during operational operations reveal inadequacies in activity preparation and monitoring or failings in the operational nature of operating documents. On these points, ASNR requests that the operator continue improving the organisation and strengthen rigour within the department responsible for reactor operations. The restart of reactor 1, following a shutdown involving a large number of maintenance operations, went smoothly overall. As regards maintenance operations, ASNR considers that they were carried out in a controlled manner by the licensee during the shutdown of reactor 1, which ended in 2025. ASNR considers that the licensee carried out the satisfactory and effective management of the leak which occurred during restart on a small diameter pipe connected to the primary circuit. The licensee successfully implemented a temporary sealing device to allow the fuel to be unloaded under satisfactory safety conditions in order to carry out the final repair. For 2026, the site must pay particular attention to coordinating and supervision activities during the shutdown of reactor 2, which began at the end of 2025 and is due to last until mid-2026, during which the replacement of the four steam generators is scheduled. Finally, considering the marine environment, ASNR will remain vigilant to ensure that the internal action plan to manage equipment corrosion on certain equipment that is particularly sensitivent is continued. The site’s performance in terms of radiation protection remained stable in 2025 with a process of detection and analysis of significant radiation protection events. There has been an improvement in the number of dosimetry anomalies. However, shortcomings were observed in the signalling of hot spots, in the management of staff access to orange-controlled areas, and a lack of rigour in the implementation of countermeasures to limit the exposure of workers. ASNR expects improvements on these points, and in general on the radiation protection culture. In terms of environmental protection, ASNR has observed a deterioration in the site’s performance, with recurrent exceedances of hydrocarbon discharges from rainwater outfalls and failures to maintain oil separators in good working order. Substantial improvements are expected in both these areas in 2026. In terms of labour inspections, 2025 was marked by a number of accidents that led to investigations by ASNR. These inspections revealed shortcomings in site preparation and rigorous execution, resulting in exposure to hazards and accidents, particularly during lifting activities. ABSTRACTS – ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025 71
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