Paluel nuclear power plant The Paluel NPP operated by EDF in the municipality of Paluel in the Seine‑Maritime département, 30 km south-west of Dieppe, comprises four 1,300 MWe PWRs commissioned between 1984 and 1986. Reactors 1, 2, 3 and 4 constitute BNIs 103, 104, 114 and 115 respectively. The site accommodates one of the regional bases of the Nuclear Rapid Intervention Force (FARN) created by EDF in 2011 further to the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident in Japan. Its role is to intervene in pre-accident or accident situations, on any NPP in France, by providing additional human resources and emergency equipment. ASNR considers that the performance of the Paluel NPP in terms of nuclear safety and radiation protection is in line with the general assessment of EDF’s NPPs. On the other hand, its environmental performance is considered to be lagging behind the general assessment of EDF’s NPPs. With regard to nuclear safety, ASNR considers the performance of the NPP to be stable and generally satisfactory. However, ASNR considers that the teams responsible for operating the reactors need to be more rigorous during the preparation and performance of activities, including periodic tests. Similarly, vigilance must be maintained with regard to failures of instrumentation and control equipment, which can lead to equipment unavailability and reactor shutdowns. In the area of maintenance, ASNR considers that the Paluel NPP has demonstrated good control over the work carried out during reactor outages and that the management of any contingencies encountered has been satisfactory. Nevertheless, improvements are expected in the preparation of unscheduled activities and in the procedures for characterising any discrepancies encountered. With a view to the fourth ten-yearly outage programmes for reactors 1 and 2 starting in 2026, ASNR considers that the licensee should pay particular attention to the operational nature of the maintenance documentation and the quality of the work carried out. More generally, ASNR considers that the licensee should take into account the findings of ASNR inspections prior to the ten-yearly outage at reactor 1 for the site’s other ten-yearly outages. In terms of radiation protection, ASNR considers that operational results are improving and satisfactory overall. However, ASNR expects the licensee to continue its efforts to strengthen the radiation protection culture, particularly in view of the heavy industrial load expected in 2026. In terms of environmental protection, ASNR notes a decline in the performance of the Paluel NPP. The management of a leak in a drainage channel at the demineralisation plant, resulting in the uncontrolled release of sulphuric acid and soda into the environment, should give rise to in-depth feedback at facility level. More generally, improvements are expected in the control of equipment used to contain environmentally hazardous substances. With regard to labour inspection, ASNR observes that the workers generally know and comply with the safety requirements. The inspections focused in particular on compliance with working hours, taking account of vital risks and accidents at work. These actions did not reveal any significant breaches of the regulations. However, a number of issues required corrective action, which will be closely monitored by ASNR. Penly nuclear power plant The Penly NPP operated by EDF in the Seine-Maritime département in the municipality of Penly, 15 km north-east of Dieppe, comprises two 1,300 MWe PWRs commissioned between 1990 and 1992. Reactor 1 constitutes BNI 136 and reactor 2 BNI 140. ASNR considers that the performance of the Penly NPP in terms of nuclear safety, radiation protection and environmental protection is broadly in line with the general assessment of performance for EDF NPPs. With regard to nuclear safety, ASNR considers that the NPP’s performance, particularly in operating rigour, is slightly below standard, despite the efforts that have been made. There have been a number of significant safety events. In particular, they are linked to shortcomings in the management of the facility’s configuration (lines or locks), communication failures within the control team and a lack of rigour in the supervision of the facility. ASNR considers that the measures taken to improve the quality of activity preparation and of the documents associated with routine operational activities (periodic tests, alignments, etc.) should be strengthened, taking human and organisational factors into account. With regard to emergency management, ASNR considers that the operator should take steps to improve its organisation and ensure effective deployment of local emergency resources. With regard to maintenance, ASNR considers that the organisation implemented by the site is robust and capable of guaranteeing the conformity and good overall condition of the equipment. However, ASNR noted occasional shortcomings in the performance of maintenance activities, whether in the preparation or execution phases, or in the traceability of deviations. Efforts must be continued in order to limit this maintenance non-quality resulting from deficiencies in document presentation or completeness. ASNR will be keeping a close eye on these issues during the outages of the two reactors scheduled for 2026. In the area of radiation protection, ASNR considers that the organisation implemented to monitor dosimetry and prevent radiation protection risks for workers is satisfactory. The inspections found a good standard of monitoring of collective prevention equipment. However, progress is expected on processes involving radiation protection risks (industrial radiography work, management of access to limited stay areas) where weaknesses have been identified. Finally, ASNR considers that the site must continue its ongoing efforts to prevent the risk of contamination, particularly in relation to the management of contaminated waste and linen. With regard to environmental protection, ASNR considers that performance is satisfactory overall. Nevertheless, progress is expected on the maintenance of oil separators and liquid containment systems. ASNR also considers that there is room for improvement in waste management, particularly in the collection and sorting areas. With regard to labour inspection, ASNR observes that the workers generally know and comply with the safety requirements. However, the inspections occasionally revealed shortcomings in the prevention of vital risks, in particular those associated with lifting activities, but also with regard to risks linked to the ventilation of work premises and fire prevention. ASNR will therefore be particularly attentive to the steps taken to reinforce the measures to prevent these risks. Normandie 72 ABSTRACTS – ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025
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