in Abstracts ASNR REPORT on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France 2025
DThe French Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection presents its Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025. This Report is required by Article L. 592-31 of the Environment Code. It was submitted to the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the Presidents of the Senate and the National Assembly and transmitted to the Parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of Scientific and Technological Choices, pursuant to the abovementioned Article.
Contents Editorial by the Commission P. 2 Editorial by the Director General P. 8 Notable events 2025 P. 12 ASNR Assessments P. 20 Regulatory news P. 32 Regional overview of nuclear safety and radiation protection P. 36 Overview of basic nuclear installations P. 100 ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025 Abstracts Find the full ASNR report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025 on asnr.fr Only regulatory news for the year 2025 is presented in this report. The regulations as a whole can be consulted on asnr.fr ADVICE TO THE READER
From left to right: Stéphanie GUÉNOT BRESSON, Commissioner; Olivier DUBOIS, Commissioner; Géraldine PINA, Commissioner; Jean‑Luc LACHAUME, Commissioner; Pierre‑Marie ABADIE, Chairman. Editorial by the Commission Adapting to a changing environment 2 ABSTRACTS – ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025
INTERNATIONAL ACTION ASNR is now well established and recognised in Europe and around the world, and has made its international activities a key part of its strategy, in full continuity with those previously carried out by ASN and IRSN. At a multilateral level, ASNR stepped up to its role as a leading independent Authority by chairing the 8th international review meeting of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. At European level, ASNR is particularly active within the ENSREG group and the WENRA, ETSON and HERCA associations, the latter being chaired by one of its Commissioners. These groups aim to promote a high standard of nuclear safety and radiation protection in Europe. ASNR is also a major player in research within its field. Its involvement in the PIANOFORTE research partnership, which it coordinates and which aims to build a European framework for radiation protection, is a good example of this. The current international context remains marked by strong interest in nuclear projects of the full range of different types, many of them innovative in nature. This impetus is reflected in a demand for standardisation, harmonisation and even simplification of regulatory approaches, particularly for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). ASNR actively participates in international work in this area, notably by promoting cooperation between safety authorities. Beyond the initiatives led by the IAEA and the European Union, ASNR considers that the harmonisation of licensing processes on an international scale, often highlighted by project developers as a prerequisite for Montrouge, 1 March 2026 This annual Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France is the first to be published by the new French Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (ASNR) since the merger of ASN and IRSN on 1 January 2025. ASNR is fully operational to carry out its missions, and can rely on its in-house expertise and access to top-level scientific knowledge to regulate and oversight, which form the basis of its technical autonomy. It also has the operational capacity to monitor and manage emergency situations, including mobile resources that can be deployed in the field. Lastly, it adopts an innovative approach on a technical and scientific level, as well as in the arrangements for the actions it takes, particularly inspections. This new edition of the annual Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection uses a number of text boxes to illustrate these aspects of ASNR’s duties. Nuclear safety and radiation protection are a national and international “common good”. In a complex world facing geopolitical, economic and climate challenges, safety is inextricably linked to the overall performance of the nuclear sector, both in the operation of existing facilities and in new projects. It requires action that is proportionate to the issues at stake, as well as attentiveness to early warning signs, and careful management of complexity at a collective level, to ensure that the right issues are addressed at the right time. For existing facilities, the primary challenge is to maintain the highest levels of safety and to plan ahead for major milestones: this is the objective of the ongoing generic review of reactor operating lifetimes up to 60 years, and of Orano’s “Continuity – Resilience” programme, which concerns the operating prospects of fuel facilities beyond 2050. These actions must be associated with a methodical reflection on the renewal of facilities in the medium to long term, to avoid ever having to arbitrate between safety and production. France has embarked on a programme of construction of reactors and fuel facilities. This raises its own challenges for licensees, industry and ASNR. “Replication” and standardisation should create a virtuous circle that also benefits nuclear safety. To achieve this, it is necessary, once again, to plan ahead in order to “de-risk” project assessment, stabilise the technical baseline requirements to enable standardisation, and guarantee manufacturing control and quality. The report illustrates this through the actions carried out in 2025. French regulations, which mainly require compliance with safety and radiation protection objectives rather than detailed technical standards, have demonstrated their ability to respond to a wide variety of issues and implications. They are therefore well suited to responding to innovation and addressing new facilities in a proportionate manner, such as Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), fusion facilities (the ITER project), and research facilities. This is a message that ASNR also promotes at an international level, particularly in discussions on the regulatory framework for fusion facilities. ABSTRACTS – ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025 3
SMR deployment, is unrealistic given the specific context of each country. On the other hand, ASNR considers that joint review of the design options for a single project by several safety authorities, upstream of licensing processes, can facilitate project development. This is the case for the joint assessment by six European safety authorities, at the initiative of ASNR, of the NUWARD reactor project led by EDF. The conflict in Ukraine remains a source of concern and vigilance. Firstly, there are constant threats to all Ukrainian nuclear power plants, whether they are in operation, shut down (Zaporizhzhia) or being decommissioned (Chernobyl). As a result, ASNR continuously monitors radioactivity levels in Ukraine and neighbouring countries, and assesses the risks posed by Ukrainian facilities in the event of an accident resulting in radioactive releases. Secondly, at European level, ASNR is heavily involved in WENRA, HERCA and ENSREG initiatives to support the Ukrainian Safety Authority. Finally, at IAEA level, this conflict has considerable significance on a day-to-day basis, and makes multilateral discussions on many subjects challenging, as shown by the difficulties encountered in reaching an international consensus on the concluding document of the 8th Joint Convention review meeting. A POLICY OF DIALOGUE WITH STAKEHOLDERS ASNR attaches great importance to technical dialogue, consultation and engagement with all stakeholders within the scope of its research and expert assessment activities, and in preparing its decision-making activities. Following its creation on 1 January 2025, ASNR reaffirmed its commitment to this approach and launched a strategic review aimed at developing its “dialogue roadmap”. In addition to its own review, ASNR has asked the High Committee for Transparency and Information on Nuclear Safety (HCTISN) to submit recommendations in early 2026. Life extension of the nuclear fleet, new nuclear projects, continued operation of “fuel cycle” facilities, new back-end facilities, decommissioning, nuclear waste management, SMRs, new uses of ionising radiation for medical applications, the use of artificial intelligence in nuclear activities, and climate change are all areas where discussions with stakeholders are essential. In this particular area, it is important to address local issues; ASNR will rely on its network of regional divisions to achieve this. In 2026, ASNR will set up a Scientific Council. Collecting stakeholders’ expectations regarding research and maintaining regular exchanges with HCTISN will enable it to identify priority areas for dialogue. 1. Extravasation is the accidental passage of an intravenously injected product, in this case a radiopharmaceutical, into the surrounding subcutaneous tissue. RADIATION PROTECTION IN THE MEDICAL FIELD In 2025, the level of radiation protection in the medical field was satisfactory, but the persistence of weaknesses and the occurrence of significant radiation protection events reflecting a lack of radiation protection culture led to a more nuanced assessment. This sector continues to face significant resource and staffing constraints, in a context of increasing activities and growing complexity of working organisations, which may lead to a dilution of responsibilities. Insufficient understanding and uptake of radiation protection issues and inadequate resources dedicated to quality and risk management were noted during inspections or identified as contributing to the occurrence of significant radiation protection events. ASNR stresses that the increasing use of external services since 2023 for the functions of radiation protection advisor or medical physicist must not be to the detriment of in-house skills or the focus on radiation protection issues, at the risk of a lasting decline in radiation protection culture. The teleradiology study confirms the importance of human and organisational factors in risk management. In brachytherapy, maintaining the activity itself represents a major challenge due to a shortage of qualified professionals. In the field of fluoroscopy-guided interventional practices, although the situation is improving slightly in operating theatres, failings that compromise patient radiation protection, combined with inadequate management of medical physics, which is often outsourced, have led to enforcement actions. In radiotherapy, despite the profession’s growing awareness of the importance of maintaining a radiation protection culture, target errors remained at the same level as in previous years. With the increase in the number of patients receiving multiple radiotherapy treatments, these target errors can occur in the context of re-irradiation, which exposes patients to greater risks of secondary side-effects. In nuclear medicine, the development of targeted internal radiotherapy is a source of risks specific to unsealed sources, such as those linked to extravasation(1) or the management of radioactively contaminated waste. In its opinion on the 6th French National Radioactive Material and Waste Management Plan, ASNR stressed the importance of a specific reflection, as part of the public debate, on developments in the management of waste and effluent from medical activities. 4 ABSTRACTS – ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025
UNPRECEDENTED RECURRENCE OF COHORT EVENTS IN CONVENTIONAL RADIOLOGY 2025 was marked by an unprecedented recurrence, in conventional radiology, of significant radiation protection events involving cohorts of patients, including children. A common factor in these events was incorrect setting of equipment parameters on commissioning, leading to systematic errors that were detected only at a late stage. The events point to shortcomings in radiation protection culture, particularly in the dose optimisation approach. ASNR stresses the importance of staff training and qualification, and of formalising practices when commissioning any new equipment or introducing new practices. It draws attention to the importance of dosimetry assessment for optimisation purposes starting from the time of installation and throughout the entire period of use. On the ground, ASNR will step up its oversight in 2026 with a conventional radiology inspection campaign in centres that carry out paediatric examinations. To promote awareness throughout the profession, a self-assessment tool will be provided to support professionals to comply with regulatory requirements and implement best practices. Lastly, an “Operational Experience Feedback” fact sheet will be distributed to raise awareness of these incidents, make them easier to detect and prevent their recurrence. Furthermore, the deployment of peer review focused on clinical practices, providing a critical viewpoint and legitimacy from professionals engaged in comparable activities, would be a significant asset in assessing the justification of procedures, and optimising them. In addition to the information provided to patients, information for the public needs to be clearer, making it easier to distinguish a minor incident from a more serious event. In radiotherapy and brachytherapy, the ASN-SFRO (French Society of Radiation Oncology) scale is used to distinguish between the importance of the failure that caused the event and the medical seriousness of the exposure. ASNR calls on professional organisations to consider developing appropriate scales for diagnostic radiology and nuclear medicine procedures as well as for targeted internal radiotherapy. ANTICIPATING AND SUPPORTING INNOVATION IN THE MEDICAL FIELD For ASNR, anticipating innovation means ensuring that radiation protection issues are considered right from the design stage, and help to guide choices and practices. To support innovation, within the scope of clinical trials, regulatory oversight arrangements need to be adapted, while ensuring that radiation protection levels are maintained. In response to the boom in clinical trials using new radionuclides for targeted internal radiotherapy, ASNR has issued an advance authorisation for possession and use of these radionuclides. This makes it possible to plan ahead for certain measures relevant to radiation protection – such as the calibration of activity meters and cameras – and facilitates the implementation of test protocols. More broadly, the challenges raised by the emergence of new radiopharmaceuticals concern not only patients, but also professionals, the public and the environment. ASNR will adopt a position in 2026 on improving radiation protection in clinical trials involving new radionuclides. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly being used in innovative techniques. ASNR will be organising a seminar on AI in medical applications in 2026. In this area, AI is already widely deployed and mature, but with a lack of transparency about the evaluation criteria used. Furthermore, its development calls for reflection on changes in responsibilities, skills and professions. Generally speaking, ASNR’s monitoring of new techniques and practices is based on its skills in research and expert assessment, as well as its various expert groups and committees. Reinforcing links and sharing knowledge among all institutional stakeholders in the healthcare sector and professional organisations would improve monitoring and promote the deployment of innovation within a secure framework, for the benefit of patients. LEARNING FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE FLAMANVILLE EPR TO GUARANTEE NUCLEAR SAFETY OVER THE DURATION OF THE EPR 2 INDUSTRIAL PROGRAMME In 2025, ASNR teams were mobilised for the review of the application authorisations to construct two EPR 2-type reactors at the Penly site (Seine-Maritime département). Following on from the review of the safety options for the new EPRs carried out in 2019, the technical expert assessment (concerning the design of key systems, consideration of internal and external hazards, accident studies without core meltdown, etc.) was completed in early 2026 without revealing any critical issues that would pose a barrier. This efficient mobilisation will enable ASNR to adopt a position in 2026. Following operational experience feedback from the construction of the EPR reactor at Flamanville and with a view to the construction of a series of EPR 2 reactors, ASNR updated its oversight of the design and manufacture of Nuclear Pressure Equipment (NPE). Following the work carried out by industry to update the RCC-M code (the French standard that sets out the design and construction rules for mechanical equipment in the nuclear islands of Pressurised Water Reactors), ASNR has stated its position on the code’s suitability for ensuring and demonstrating compliance with regulatory requirements. This major development, which has been under way for several years, provides stabilised technical baseline requirements for the EPR 2 programme. At the same time, discussions are continuing on ASNR’s guide to NPE conformity ABSTRACTS – ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025 5
assessment, with the aim of revisiting the guide in 2026. ASNR aims to implement earlier and more progressive oversight of the design and manufacture of NPE, to avoid deviations emerging or being dealt with too late, and by specifying oversight requirements sufficiently far in advance to enable those involved to plan ahead for them and incorporate them within a stable framework. ASNR also reviewed the design of the major components for the main primary system and the main secondary systems of the first EPR 2 reactors up to the beginning of 2026, enabling manufacturers to begin production. In the light of operating experience feedback from the construction of the Flamanville EPR, ASNR reiterates the importance of guaranteeing the quality of components for future EPR 2 reactors, and continued its inspections of the supply chain for safety-important equipment. These inspections enabled oversight of the manufacturing processes that the suppliers used, their organisational provisions, the implementation of the licensee’s requirements within the subcontracting chain, and the supervision that EDF is required to carry out. ASNR considers that the support work carried out by EDF must be continued so that the entire sector, which still has weaknesses, reaches the level of quality and rigour required by the issues at stake. Finally, as part of an early-stage review specific to the project to build a pair of EPR 2 reactors at Gravelines (Nord département), where the ground is relatively soft over a significant depth, ASNR identified points requiring particular attention regarding the foundation design. Based on new information provided by EDF concerning detailed geotechnical knowledge of the site’s subsoil and the design of the foundations, the investigation of this issue will continue in 2026. ENSURING THE LONG-TERM SAFETY OVERSIGHT OF THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FLEET IN OPERATION 2025 was marked by the startup and power increase of the Flamanville EPR, which were subject to specific oversight by ASNR teams. The transition from managing a construction worksite to operation of a reactor was characterised by numerous events, none of which had a major impact on nuclear safety. For the first refuelling outage, EDF plans an ambitious programme of inspection and equipment replacement activities, starting in autumn 2026. ASNR is currently considering the corresponding modification requests. Regarding the Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) affecting some auxiliary piping systems in reactors currently in operation, EDF’s inspections continued, and have so far detected more than 80 significant cracks, some of which call into question the mechanical strength of the piping. ASNR currently considers the situation to be under control, as EDF has identified sensitive piping, and has at its disposal effective non-destructive testing capabilities, as well as, where necessary, techniques for replacement of the affected sections of piping. Against this backdrop, EDF has proposed a long-term monitoring strategy for the piping concerned, on which ASNR will state its position in 2026. ASNR considers that EDF must, in parallel, further improve its understanding of the conditions under which stress corrosion cracking occurs. As of 1 January 2026, 25 of the 56 nuclear power reactors currently in operation (excluding the Flamanville EPR) have exceeded 40 years of operation, which was the design lifetime for certain of their components. Continuing to operate them means managing the ageing of their components, adapting to changes in operating conditions (due to climate change, etc.), and making improvements to bring their safety level closer to that of the most recent reactors. This safety level has been defined based on experience feedback from major nuclear accidents. The experience acquired during the assessment of the fourth Periodic Safety Reviews of the 900 MWe reactors, the oldest in the fleet, enabled ASNR to state an opinion on the conditions for continued operation of the 20 1,300 MWe reactors up to a 50-year lifetime in July 2025, i.e. sufficiently in advance of the first associated ten-yearly outage, which began at the Paluel nuclear power plant in January 2026. The oldest 900 MWe reactor will undergo its fifth ten-yearly outage in 2029. As part of the stabilised safety objectives, the fifth Periodic Safety Review of the 900 MWe reactors will focus, according to the guidelines defined in 2025, on maintaining the compliance of facilities and addressing climate change. Finally, in an energy context that suggests interest in the longterm life extension of reactors, ASNR has, since 2023, favoured the adoption of a generic approach, together with EDF, to anticipate the effects of ageing, mainly in non-replaceable components, likely to affect the possibility of operating reactors over 60 years of age in complete safety, and to identify possible levers for remediation. Following a review of the documents that EDF provided and a technical dialogue with the stakeholders, ASNR will issue an opinion at the end of 2026. In addition, the inspections carried out by ASNR in 2025 show that EDF still needs to make progress in a number of areas, such as preparation of maintenance activities, management of spare parts and the quality of supervision of subcontracted activities, to ensure the long-term operation of the fleet. 6 ABSTRACTS – ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025
ENSURING THE LONG-TERM VIABILITY OF FUEL FACILITIES From the extraction of uranium ore to the reprocessing of spent fuel and the storage of radioactive waste, the industrial fuel chain is made up of numerous nuclear facilities, each of which is often unique. The failure of one link can considerably disrupt this chain. The French Government’s decision to continue the reprocessing policy as part of the new nuclear programme means, on the one hand, undertaking a comprehensive programme to strengthen the resilience of existing plants and extend their operation and, on the other hand, preparing for the renewal of production assets to meet long-term needs. After several years of difficulties, 2025 saw a recovery in production at the Melox plant, France’s only MOX (Mixed OXide Fuel) production plant, which helps manage the risk of saturation of reprocessing plants’ storage pools. Based on current flows, these pools are expected to reach saturation by around 2040, with storage capacity margins remaining limited until the commissioning of the new pools planned at the La Hague site, which will ultimately serve the reprocessing plant as part of Orano’s “Future Back-End” project. The “Future Back-End” project is crucial to the robustness of the French industrial fuel chain. Orano has set up a project organisation with ASNR, to ensure the smooth review of future files, starting with the first safety options dossiers expected from 2026, as well as the design standards that will support them and which need to serve as a reference for the entire programme. At the same time, the examination of the Periodic Safety Reviews, and of operations to refurbish and ensure the longterm future of existing plants – known as the “Continuity – Resilience” project – is ramping up. SECURING HUMAN AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO MEET LEGACY LIABILITIES At a time when nuclear power is being “renewed”, attention to older facilities, whether still in operation or shut down, must not waver, particularly during the decommissioning phase. Decommissioning is a lengthy process, and the preparation itself also takes a great deal of time, involving the design of operations that were not considered when the oldest facilities were originally designed, or the definition of solutions to address liabilities identified during site surveys, such as retrieval of waste, contamination or pollution. Ultimately, therefore, decommissioning requires substantial financial means, significant engineering resources, and sometimes heavy equipment. Despite efforts by the licensees concerned to rank and prioritise projects, ASNR observes that, due to insufficient resources, numerous decommissioning projects are delayed. This increases both the associated legacy burden and the risks to the environment and to people, including those responsible for monitoring the shutdown facilities. The French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) is currently the most exposed licensee, as its assets include a large proportion of facilities that have been definitively shut down or are being decommissioned. The decommissioning programme, drawn up by CEA and approved by the civil and military safety authorities in 2019, was based on prioritisation according to the source term and the risks posed by the facilities. It has suffered major delays and needs to be thoroughly revised. In this context, it appears necessary to ring-fence the needed financial and human resources to enable it to meet reasonable decommissioning schedules. ASNR expects CEA to submit an updated decommissioning and waste management strategy by 2026, drawing on experience feedback from the difficulties encountered and accompanied by a consolidated schedule. THE ONGOING CIGÉO PROJECT During 2025, ASNR’s departments completed the technical review of the creation authorisation application for the Cigéo deep geological repository for radioactive waste, and concluded the associated cycle of technical dialogue with all of the project stakeholders. ASNR issued its opinion on the Cigéo authorisation application at the end of 2025 and presented it to the French Parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of Scientific and Technological Choices (OPECST). Without disregarding the additional information still to be provided by the French National Radioactive Waste Management Agency (Andra) and the strong expectations of the public, ASNR considered that the preliminary safety case had reached a sufficient level of maturity at this stage of the project, and that the reference inventory used as a basis by Andra constituted a robust foundation for defining the waste inventory authorised for disposal at Cigéo. Finally, ASNR considered that the project’s development schedule appeared realistic in light of the available information. n ABSTRACTS – ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025 7
2025, a decisive first year of operation in the performance of our duties Olivier GUPTA, Director General Editorial by the Director General 8 ABSTRACTS – ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025
2025: THE YEAR ASNR WAS ESTABLISHED Ensuring the day-to-day running of ASNR On 2 January 2025, an initial set of resolutions was adopted to define roles and responsibilities within ASNR. The Commission thus approved the initial organisation of the departments as well as delegated powers, enabling the institution to begin operating and to integrate its first teams while ensuring continuity of service. These resolutions were supplemented by the adoption of ASNR’s internal rules of procedure in January. As far as budgetary and financial aspects are concerned, budget programme 235, “Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection”, now provides Parliament with a clear and unified view of the resources dedicated to this subject. The foundations have been laid for the proper functioning of the budgetary and accounting chain, and an initial framework for procurement management has been defined. A number of measures have been taken to bring the two pre-existing information systems closer together. ASNR’s single Emergency Response Centre has been set up. The arrangements for publishing expert opinions have been defined. A Scientific Director has been recruited. In terms of human resources and social dialogue, a joint ASNR body bringing together the employee representative bodies of ASN and IRSN was established in the first half of 2025. Initial steps have also been taken to define an attractive employment and skills framework for ASNR: a unified recruitment policy has been established, and a method agreement covering the timetable for renegotiating collective agreements has been signed. Finally, the Ethics and Professional Conduct Committee was set up in December. In particular, it is responsible for issuing an opinion on general matters relating to the application of the rules of professional conduct in ASNR’s departments and for answering questions relating to individual cases, in particular on the crucial issue of professional mobility. It is necessary to reconcile compliance with ethical rules, in particular the impartial exercise of the oversight mission entrusted to ASNR by the legislator, with the need to promote the attractiveness of ASNR. In a sector where specialised profiles are scarce, it is also essential to encourage mobility between ASNR and the organisations it oversees, in order to disseminate and enrich technical knowledge and safety culture across the nuclear sector as a whole. Establishing ASNR within its ecosystem ASNR has undertaken several actions to maintain and strengthen, in continuity with its two predecessor organisations, its relationships with stakeholders: licensees, government departments and public bodies, Parliament, research organisations, the academic community, civil society stakeholders, foreign counterparts and international organisations, among others. Numerous partnerships and agreements covering a wide range of areas have been signed. An initial strategy for dialogue with civil society has been established, and the associated roadmap is currently being drawn up. It will be presented to the HCTISN and then to the OPECST in spring 2026. Montrouge, 1 March 2026 The French Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (ASNR) was created on 1 January 2025, as part of the reform of the governance of nuclear safety and radiation protection oversight mandated by the Act of 21 May 2024. With just over a year’s hindsight, I can see how far we have already come in setting up this new institution, while carrying out our missions across all our areas of activity: research, expert assessment and review, and oversight. This was made possible by the commitment and dedication of ASNR staff, particularly those working in crossfunctional and support areas. I would like to thank them warmly. The work of setting up ASNR, initiated on a preparatory basis in 2024, was stepped up considerably in 2025 in the areas of finance, logistics, legal affairs, digital technology, human resources, management and communications. Continuity of operations between ASNR and the two entities that preceded it was thus ensured. The year 2025 also provided the opportunity to initiate transformations that will continue in 2026. Beyond the necessary organisational changes, the aim is to enable ASNR, guided by its strategic orientations, to fully play its role in the current context of nuclear renewal and innovation in the sector. ABSTRACTS – ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025 9
Adapting the internal organisation The ASNR’s first year of existence was also marked by the continuation of reorganisation work, both for the “cross- functional and support” teams and for the “core activities” teams. Most of the cross-functional and support departments, which were merged on 1 January, quickly began work on a more precise definition of a new internal organisation, to be implemented from the second half of 2025. It should be noted that this work was carried out in a context of significantly increased workload, as these departments were heavily involved in setting up ASNR. As regards the “core activities” departments, the first half of the year was mainly devoted to setting up a working method to identify possible reorganisation options, and to preliminary discussions involving the directors concerned. As a result, in June 2025 organisational principles were defined that were compatible with the provisions of the act of 21 May 2024. Coordinators were then appointed to translate these principles into a more complete organisation, which is due to be presented to employee representative bodies in spring 2026. 2026: CONTINUING THE TRANSFORMATION OF ASNR IN SUPPORT OF ITS MISSIONS Work on setting up ASNR will continue throughout 2026. The coming months will be marked by the reorganisation of our “core activities” departments, which will draw on the strengths of a united team and the diversity of our skills. Staff elections will take place in the second half of March, enabling the establishment of new social dialogue bodies. A significant effort will be made to strengthen cohesion through the identification and definition of ASNR’s values and its “employer brand”. Work on harmonising our operations will continue, with further advances in the convergence of information systems and the introduction of an integrated management system. A Scientific Council will be set up in accordance with the provisions of Article L. 592-28-3 of the Environment Code. The composition of this Council will reflect the diversity of scientific fields. In particular, it will be consulted on ASNR’s scientific strategy and research programmes, and will contribute to scientific assessment. The Advisory Committees of Experts (GPEs) will continue to carry out their tasks until the end of their members’ terms of office at the end of 2026, and at the same time preparations will be made to renew their membership, with a view to the new term of office taking effect on 1 January 2027. ASNR will submit its second report to OPECST assessing its creation and the implementation of the reform introduced by Act 2024-450 of 21 May 2024 relative to the organisation of nuclear safety and radiation protection governance, in order to address the challenges of the nuclear industry’s renewal. Finally, 2026 will be used to prepare a new IRRS peer review mission (which involves ASNR being audited by a team of counterparts from other countries), to be conducted in 2027. For ASNR, an independent administrative Authority, undergoing regular external peer review is essential. STRATEGIC ORIENTATIONS GUIDING ASNR’S ACTION During the first year of its existence, ASNR staff have been reflecting on the strategic challenges facing ASNR and the changes that need to be made. Four main orientations have been identified in the current context of nuclear renewal and innovation. They will guide ASNR’s actions over the coming years. Nuclear safety and radiation protection must be proportionate to the issues at stake ASNR operates in a constrained environment, where time and resources are limited, both for itself and for the organisations it oversees. In the context of nuclear renewal, ASNR will strengthen its ability to prioritise and rank issues across all its activities and to apply a clear graded approach. The renewal of the nuclear industry presents collective challenges distinct from the operation of existing facilities There is a need to ensure that nuclear safety is taken into account as far upstream as possible in new projects, to stabilise baseline requirements, and to provide visibility on regulatory deadlines and dovetail them with project milestones. ASNR will develop its ability to plan ahead, by monitoring early warning signs, and to mobilise knowledge and expertise. It will pay particular attention to managing assessments, ensuring both rigour and efficiency while controlling timelines. Where necessary, it will continue to develop new practices and approaches, as it has done in recent years with innovative reactor project developers. The challenge of innovation: medical applications, Small Modular Reactors and artificial intelligence A number of areas are characterised by strong innovation. ASNR is positioning itself to respond to new challenges, whether technical, organisational or oversight-related, and to adapt appropriately. To this end, it will continue to deploy innovative working methods during the preparatory stages of the instruction. It will develop its own expertise through a proactive and forward-looking research policy. Finally, it will take on board the opportunities and risks of artificial intelligence 10 ABSTRACTS – ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025
in a controlled manner across all its missions, both in terms of its use by those responsible for nuclear activities and its internal use. Managing complexity Nuclear safety is a key component of performance in industrial projects and must be considered at every stage, from design to implementation. However, measures taken during design and construction must not make the operation of nuclear installations overly complex, as this would be detrimental to both nuclear safety and radiation protection. In its role, ASNR will contribute to managing the complexity of the baseline requirements used in nuclear facilities. It also intends to improve the integration into expert assessments, reviews and inspections of the practical factors that have an impact on nuclear safety. ֍*** There is still a great deal of work to be done in 2026 to stabilise ASNR’s internal operations and establish a fully mature organisational structure, and to enable it to fully play its role in the context of nuclear renewal. The guidelines adopted by ASNR will guide its action over the next few years. I know I can count on the commitment of all staff to successfully implementing these changes, while fully carrying out all our tasks, to benefit the protection of people and the environment. n ABSTRACTS – ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025 11
NOTABLE EVENTS 2025 12 ABSTRACTS – ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025
page 14 01 RADIATION PROTECTION CULTURE NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED AFTER SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AFFECTING PATIENT COHORTS page 18 03 OUTLOOK FOR CONTINUED OPERATION OF EDF’S NUCLEAR REACTORS page 16 02 CIGÉO: ASNR HAS ISSUED ITS OPINION ON THE CREATION AUTHORISATION APPLICATION ABSTRACTS – ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025 13
The year 2025 was marked by the occurrence of several significant events in conventional radiology. These situations involving cohorts of patients(1) and in particular paediatric patients(2) during radiological examinations are rare events, although not exceptional in view of the Significant Radiation Protection Events (ESRs) reported to ASNR since 2008. In 2025, several significant events relating to overexposure beyond Diagnostic Reference Levels (DRLs) were notified to ASNR in the field of conventional radiology(see box). 1. Cohort: group of individuals considered as a whole and participating in a statistical study of the circumstances of occurrence of diseases. 2. The paediatric population includes children and adolescents from birth up to and including the age of 17. Three of these events concerned a large number of patients, with overexposure that, in some cases, went unrecognised for several years. Patients affected by exposure to doses higher than those normally used for the examinations carried out were informed by the healthcare facilities. Analysis of these events systematically reveals multifactorial causes, although there are some common elements: ∙a fault in the parameter settings of the X-ray equipment used, often occurring on commissioning of the equipment concerned, or on return to service after maintenance; ∙inadequate training of healthcare professionals in the use of equipment; ∙shortcomings in the approach to optimising patient doses, in terms of setting up examination protocols, collecting delivered doses, and utilising dosimetry data (leading to late detection of exceedances). ASNR analyses and inspections have also revealed a lack of radiation protection culture, evidenced in particular by: ∙a lack of critical analysis of the doses delivered during examinations; ∙a lack of suitable resources and tools for analysing and archiving doses delivered; ∙shortcomings in retrospective assessments of the doses delivered to patients, with a lack of data collection for the completion of DRLs, particularly with regard to paediatric DRLs; ∙failure to systematically record the dose delivered to the patient in procedure reports. Significant radiation protection events in conventional radiology Radiation protection culture needs to be improved after several significant events affecting patient cohorts NOTABLE EVENTS 2025
Equipment installation and commissioning: a critical stage in optimisation The installation and commissioning of new radiology equipment is a critical stage. A medical device must be “properly supplied, correctly installed, maintained and used in accordance with its intended purpose” according to Article R. 5211-17 of the Public Health Code, and “accompanied by the information necessary to ensure it can be used correctly and safely, taking into account the training and knowledge of potential users”. In several cases, users(3) were trained in the use of the device when the equipment was installed, but the high turnover in radiology teams meant that users’ knowledge of the machines’ functions (collimation, filtration, etc.) could not be maintained over time. The lack of formally established protocols for the equipment in question contributed to this loss of knowledge, since the basic documents needed to build the skills of new arrivals and implement best practice were non-existent. ASNR points out that training – including qualification of personnel in the use of medical devices – and the establishment of formalised practices are essential safety barriers. In addition, optimisation of the doses delivered by the equipment at the time of its installation, taking into account the various procedures for which it is intended, must be carried out in consultation with the various professionals involved: doctors, radiographers, medical physicists and the supplier’s application engineer. The involvement of the medical physicist and the doctors at this stage is not always observed, even though the optimisation process must be implemented on a collaborative basis in order to achieve the best compromise between the doses delivered and the desired image quality. ASNR calls for a stronger radiation protection culture in the field of conventional radiology Optimisation on commissioning of equipment must be supplemented by a regular optimisation process based on analysis of quality controls, regular collection of doses delivered to patients, implementation of regular dosimetry assessments, analysis of the results of these assessments, and comparison of the latter with the DRLs, where they exist. All these elements constitute barriers enabling teams to be rapidly alerted with respect to any malfunctions or misuse. The significant events that occurred in 2025 highlight the importance of connecting radiology equipment to a Dose Archiving and Communication System (DACS) to facilitate analysis of the doses delivered. In this respect, ASNR considers that it would be appropriate to strengthen the regulatory obligations for activities for which these systems are not currently required. In addition, key information for patient monitoring, including the dose received, must be recorded in the procedure report by the person carrying out the imaging procedure. 3. See the guide entitled ‘Recommendations on training in the use of medical devices emitting ionising radiation’ on the ASNR website. ASNR points out that the primary guarantee of a high level of radiation protection lies in a robust radiation protection culture, fostered by trained professionals equipped with appropriate resources and tools. Based on Operating Experience Feedback (OEF) from significant events, ASNR will undertake several initiatives over the coming months and years: ∙It will step up its controls by carrying out a campaign of paediatric radiology inspections in 2026, during which it will provide professionals with a self-assessment tool so that they can assess their regulatory compliance with radiation protection requirements and ensure that good radiation protection practices are implemented. ∙As these events have highlighted the difficulties in communicating with both the general public and patients, ASNR will begin work on these subjects in collaboration with the Professional Radiology Council (G4) in particular. To date, there is no communication scale for radiology and nuclear medicine activities similar to the ASN-SFRO scale, developed for radiotherapy, which facilities understanding of the severity of notified events. ∙As part of the ongoing revision of ASN resolution 2019-DC- 0667 of 18 April 2019 setting DRL values, OEF from these significant events will be used to encourage analysis and feedback for paediatric procedures. Diagnostic Reference Levels (DRLs), a tool for optimisation The principle of optimising exposure to ionising radiation, established by Article L. 1333-2 of the Public Health Code and specified in R. 1333-61 of the same Code, has led to the introduction of the concept of “Diagnostic Reference Levels” (DRLs) in the area of medical imaging using ionising radiation. These DRLs, which must not be considered “dose limits”, are established according to the type of examination, and differ between adults and children. DRLs are thus dosimetric indicators used to assess the quality of practices. They are only meaningful when assessing average practice (based on groups of patients) and should not be compared with an individual patient’s exposure. Therefore, the comparison of a DRL value with a dose received during an individual examination is not relevant for a given individual, because in certain situations the conditions of the examination can justify a higher value (to take into account the patient’s morphology for example, or other factors that do not call into question the benefit/risk ratio of the procedure). ABSTRACTS – ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025 15
NOTABLE EVENTS 2025 In November 2025, on completion of the technical review of the creation authorisation application for Cigéo, ASNR issued its opinion(1) on this application, called for by Article L. 542-10-1 of the Environment Code. 1. https://www.asnr.fr/actualites/lasnr-publie-son-avis-sur-la-demande-dautorisation-de-creation-de-cigeo 2. Estimated radiological dose (in Sieverts) at a facility’s liquid or gaseous release points, calculated on the basis of the characteristics of the effluents released, in order to assess the potential radiological impact on the environment and populations. After several decades of research and development, in January 2023 Andra submitted a Creation Authorisation Application (DAC) for a deep geological waste disposal repository. This facility, called “Cigéo”, is intended for the disposal of high and intermediate-level long-lived radioactive waste. Following the referral from the Ministry for Energy Transition received in March 2023, ASNR carried out a technical review of the dossier and issued its opinion on it. This opinion was issued at the end of a conventional expert assessment and review process, accompanied by steps to gather the expectations and concerns of stakeholders (in particular the Local Information and Monitoring Committee (CLIS) for the Bure laboratory, the National Association of Local Information Committees and Commissions (Anccli), representatives of associations and civil society in general, etc.) in the form of consultations on referrals issued by ASN (and subsequently ASNR) to IRSN and the Advisory Committee of Experts for Waste (GPD), a technical dialogue during the expert assessment of the dossier, and a consultation on ASNR’s draft opinion with stakeholders. The expert assessment of DAC submitted by Andra was organised along three thematic lines: the basic data adopted for the Cigéo safety assessment, the safety of the surface and underground facilities during the operational phase, and longterm safety. At the end of each phase, IRSN, and subsequently ASNR’s Environmental Research and Expert Assessment Department, together with the GPD, submitted their expert assessment reports on the dossier submitted by Andra. The opinion issued by ASNR, as required under Article L. 54210-1 of the Environment Code, will accompany the creation authorisation application file during the public inquiry into the project, in order to inform the public about the technical issues relating to the safety of the facility as presented in the file. In its opinion, ASNR considers that Andra has acquired a sufficient knowledge base concerning the basic data adopted for the safety assessment and that the safety case for the operating and post-closure phases, established on this knowledge base, is satisfactory at the DAC stage. This safety case must be supplemented with a view to commissioning (limited to the pilot industrial phase). The pilot industrial phase was legally introduced in Article L. 542-10-1 of the Environment Code, following the public debate on the Cigéo project in 2013. The objective of this initial phase in the development of the Cigéo project will be to progressively test Cigéo’s technical and operational functionalities under real conditions. It aims to confirm the reversibility of the facility, and to confirm its safety case, in particular through a programme of in situ tests. The opinion also sets out the elements that ASNR considers necessary for the update of the file, scheduled before the public inquiry, as well as the elements expected at later stages of the project’s development, particularly during the pilot industrial phase. ASNR considers that the commitments made by Andra to update the creation authorisation application file prior to the public inquiry meet the expectations raised during the technical review. This additional information relates to the adaptability of Cigéo, uncertainties regarding the volume of primary packages, the inventory of toxic chemical substances and their long-term impact on health, the contribution of carbon-14 (14C) to the dose at outlets from the facility(2), and sealing. Cigéo ASNR has issued its opinion on the creation authorisation application Cigéo is the project for the reversible disposal of ultimate radioactive waste. It will be established in Bure (Meuse département). The waste that will be stored in Cigéo is known as high-level long-lived waste (HLW-LL) and intermediate-level long-lived waste (ILW-LL). It originates mainly from the operation and decommissioning of French nuclear facilities, and in particular from the recycling of spent nuclear fuel. The waste will be inserted into disposal containers and lowered by robotic devices to a depth of around 500 m, in the middle of a layer of clay more than 140 m thick and 160 million years old. Cigéo is scheduled to be fully commissioned in 2055, and to operate for around 100 years. Its cost, which is currently being reassessed, was set at €25 billion in 2016. 16 ABSTRACTS – ASNR Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2025
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